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ABSTRACT
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE, COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.
By
PAUL KAGUNDU
August 2006
Committee Chair:

Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez

Major Department:

Economics

This dissertation seeks to analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the impact
of quality of governance on growth by looking at various dimensions of the concept of
governance. We use a dynamic panel estimator and various indicators of governance to
estimate the impact of governance on growth. Our empirical results suggest a positive
and statistically significant impact of governance on growth.
The second part of the analysis looks at a possible transmission mechanism of the
effect of governance on growth through the composition of expenditures. As such, we
estimate a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model with shares of three functional
categories of public expenditures – education, health, and defense – in total spending as
the dependent variables. We find that high quality governance leads to a higher share of
education and health expenditures and a lower share of defense expenditures in total
expenditures.
Further, we examine the impact of governance of public capital spending. Our
empirical results from this analysis suggest that high quality governance is associated
with a smaller share of capital expenditures in total expenditures

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores the impact of institutional factors on the rate of
economic growth and a possible transmission channel through allocation of Public
resources. We develop a simple theoretical model that explicitly introduces the quality of
governance and the composition of public expenditures into a growth model based on one
developed by Devaranjan et al. (1996). We theoretically show that the impact of the
quality of governance on the rate of growth could, in part, be transmitted through the
composition of public expenditures.
As has been shown by a number of researchers, allocation of public expenditures
has an impact on the rate of growth.1 Therefore, if the quality of governance and
institutions impacts the allocation of public expenditures, it impacts the rate of growth
indirectly. Our model shows that shares of some expenditure types or functions in total
public spending are expected to rise with deterioration in the quality of governance, while
shares of other types or functional expenditure categories are expected to fall with a
decline in the quality of governance. As we discuss later, these findings could have
significant policy implications especially in most developing countries where significant
proportions of their populations are living in abject poverty.
Empirically, using several indicators of quality of governance, we estimate the
effect of quality of governance on the rate of growth in per capita GDP. To explore the
potential transmission channel through the composition of public expenditures, we also
estimate the effect of quality of governance on the functional composition of public
1

This literature is reviewed in the next Chapter.

1
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expenditures. We implement this estimation using a system of three seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR). The first equation estimates the impact of quality of governance on
the share of health expenditures in total public expenditures. The second equation
estimates the impact of quality of governance on the share of education expenditures in
total public expenditures. The third and last equation in the system estimates the impact
of quality of governance on the share of defense spending in total public expenditures.
Further, we look at the composition of expenditures by economic characteristics
of the expenditure – capital spending versus recurrent expenditures. This classification of
expenditures is drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance
Statistics (GFS). Accordingly, we estimate the effect of quality of governance on the
share of capital expenditures in total public expenditures as a separate regression model
from the functional categories in the SUR system.
Finally, we do a Sub-Saharan Africa sub-sample analysis due to the fact that it is
the least developed of the world’s continents and has had relatively more political and
institutional problems in the post-independence era.

Motivation

For more than a decade now, there has been consensus on the importance of good
governance in economic performance. Widespread economic, political, and social
problems in developing countries can be attributed, at least in part, to public institutions
that are run by corrupt and authoritarian leaders. Such weak institutions are particularly
vulnerable to capture by vested interests. These vested interests stand in the way of
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reforms that are aimed at promoting economic and political competition, which would in
turn eliminate rents extracted by the vested interests. As a result, the state fails to
establish appropriate rules and institutions to enforce contracts and protect property
rights, which are essential for effective functioning of a market economy. This will likely
have negative implications to economic growth and development as will be discussed in
later Chapters of the dissertation.
As a result of this apparent link between institutions and growth, international
financial organizations notably the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations have
facilitated efforts for reform in developing countries. Aid to developing countries has
been conditioned on showing progress in public sector reforms, political reforms in terms
of allowing greater civil liberties and political rights, transparency in the budgetary
process and accountability in government at the national level.
Our goal in this study is to analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the impact
of quality of governance on growth by looking at various dimensions of the concept of
governance. As noted above, the second part of our analysis looks at a possible
transmission mechanism of the effect of governance on growth through the composition
of expenditures.
Pradhan (1996) points out that the World Bank public expenditure reviews have
identified public expenditure “imbalances” in developing countries in favor of capital
expenditures and wage expenditures. Understanding the factors that contribute to this
imbalance in public spending and generally exploring the link between governance and
allocation of public expenditures is important for two main reasons: (1) it will contribute
to the literature explaining the role of institutional factors in economic development, and
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(2) from the policymakers’ point of view, if good governance leads to a “better”
allocation of public expenditures, then international financial institutions such as the
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as bilateral donors
should focus their efforts and resources on institutional reforms, enhancing the
democratization process and the rule of law in developing countries. This would
contribute to a more socially optimal allocation of public resources.

The Need for Theoretical Analysis

There is need to extend the existing theoretical models on institutions and
economic performance in order to establish a firm basis for the empirical work done in
this dissertation. Recent growth models such as Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992), and Palivos and Yip (1995) have extended endogenous growth models to
incorporate public finance.2 These models have primarily examined the role of fiscal
policy (Barro 1990) in the growth process. Palivos and Yip (1995) examine the impact of
the way government finances its spending (raising taxes versus issuing money) on the
growth process. This is a significant contribution to the literature as it highlights the
impact of government actions on economic growth. However, these models do not
examine the impact of the composition of total government expenditures on the growth
process. Devarajan et al. (1996) make this extension by examining how a change in the
composition of expenditures impacts the growth process.
The theoretical model we present in Chapter III of this dissertation extends the
Devaranjan et al. model, and explicitly recognizes that decisions on allocation of public
2

See also Rebelo (1991) and Romer (1986)
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expenditures are not done by benevolent despots or “social planners” whose primary goal
is to maximize social welfare. In other words, we introduce in the model a parameter of
quality of governance to capture the rules and constraints within which decision-makers
act.
Without an effective incentive mechanism, decision-makers will allocate public
resources to maximize their private rents and not the common good. Our model brings
together the quality of governance and the composition of public expenditures in a
growth model and allows us to analyze a potential transmission mechanism of the impact
of governance on economic growth.

The Need for Empirical Analysis

The theoretical analysis links the quality of governance and economic growth, and
quality of governance and the composition of public expenditures. To inform policy,
there is need for an empirical investigation that will provide quantitative effects of quality
of governance on economic growth and on the composition of public expenditures.
A number of cross country studies have used various indicators of governance to
study its impact on economic growth.3 Indicators of democracy (indexes of civil liberties
and political rights) are the most widely used indicators of governance. Others are
indicators of maintenance of the rule of law and control of corruption. We build on these
studies by expanding the set of indicators of quality of governance to include an index of
quality of the government bureaucracy, an index of risk of repudiation of government
contracts, and an index of the risk of expropriation of private contracts.
3

See Chapter II for a detailed review of the literature.
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In addition, we examine the impact of quality of governance on the composition
of public expenditures. The literature on institutional factors and the composition of
public expenditures is limited. Most studies do not explicitly control for
political/institutional quality. There are however a few studies such as Tanzi and Davoodi
(1997), Mauro (1998), and Sturm (2001) that do include some measures of institutional
quality such as indicators of corruption, and the political ideology of the political leaders
or party in power. Our analysis is within this framework. In the coming chapters, we
show how we build on to this existing literature and how we deal with specific empirical
issues that we believe have not been effectively addressed in previous studies.

The Sub-Saharan Africa Case

There are a number of reasons for treating Sub-Saharan Africa separately from the
more developed regions. Colander (2004) estimates Africa’s average annual per capita
GDP growth rate for the period 1950-2000 at 0.8 percent compared to 2.4 percent for
Asia (excluding Japan and China), 1.4 percent for Latin America, 1.8 percent for North
America, and 1.8 percent for the entire world. Other estimates by Ndulu and O’Connell
(1999) put the average growth rate in real GDP per worker for the period 1960-1994 at
0.39 percent for a group of Sub-Saharan African countries and at -0.44 percent for the
period 1973-1994. This contrasts with 3.14 percent and 1.65 percent respectively for a
group of comparable developing countries from other regions.
So, what explains Sub-Saharan Africa’s dismal economic performance relative to
the rest of the world? A number of factors have been identified in the literature, notably
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the geographic location in the warm and disease-infected tropics that affects labor
productivity and the colonial heritage that has not helped efforts to build good institutions
of governance.4 This link between Africa’s poor economic performance and the quality
of political and economic institutions is clear when one observes political and economic
events in the region over the past four decades.
As observed by Ndulu and O’Connell (1999), trends in per capita income growth
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa indicate rapid growth in the 1960s, declining growth rates in
the 1970s and 1980s and marked improvements in the 1990s. This trend coincides with
the growth of dictatorships and authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s and the
development of relatively more pluralist and democratic rule in the 1990s.
These events suggest a clear link between political or institutional factors and
economic growth. Thus, a separate analysis of the Sub-Saharan Africa sample will enable
us to gauge whether the adverse effects of poor institutions of governance are greater in
magnitude in this region relative to other regions of the world.

Overview of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a working
definition of governance based on definitions used in earlier research and a brief review
of the literature on governance and economic performance. This Chapter also reviews
literature on the composition of public expenditures. In Chapter III, we develop a simple
theoretical model linking governance, the composition of expenditures and economic

4

See Acemoglu, et al. (2001)
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growth. Chapter IV describes the empirical estimation methods and the data. Chapter V
presents and discusses the empirical results. Chapter VI concludes the dissertation.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the past fifteen years, the literature on governance and its various links to
economic performance has burgeoned. This literature is motivated by the apparent
correlation between the quality of institutions and differences in standards of living
across countries. So, in this Chapter, we provide a survey of some of the main findings
emanating from some of these studies. We will discuss measures of governance used in
the literature, and highlight some of the difficulties in assessing the economic impact of
governance, both theoretically and empirically. Further, we will review some of the
studies that focus on causes of differences in institutions across countries.
So, the Chapter layout is as follows. In the first section, we briefly review the
various definitions of governance that have been used by researchers in this area. In the
second section, we discuss the causes of differences in the quality of institutions. In the
third section, we look at the theoretical links between the quality of governance and
economic performance as established in the literature. In the fourth section, we highlight
the empirical literature on governance, the various measures of governance employed in
different studies and the problems encountered in empirically teasing out the impact of
governance on measures of economic performance. In this section, we also discuss how
our work and methodology expands and improves on existing literature

9
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Finally, the fifth section discusses the link between quality of governance and the
composition of public expenditures, and our contribution to this strand of literature.

Defining Governance

While the literature does not provide any single precise definition of the term
governance, there seems to be consensus about its dimensions. “Public governance has
been associated with how governments are structured, what processes they employ in
governing and what results they are able to accomplish in regard to the needs of those
that they serve” (Jreisat 2002). These dimensions encompass the organization of social,
economic and political systems, allocation of public resources to members of society, and
acquisition and exercise of political power, all of which are important for economic and
social development of any society.
As discussed by Keefer (2004), the term governance is “very elastic and multidimensional.” However, Keefer (2004) also points out that most definitions relate to “the
extent to which governments are responsive to citizens and provide them with certain
core services, such as protection of property rights, and more generally the rule of law,
and the extent to which institutions give government decision makers an incentive to be
responsive to citizens.”
Because of the multi-dimensional nature of governance, a number of definitions
have emerged in the literature. In 1989, the World Bank defined governance as “the
exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs.” The African Development Bank
(1999) extends the World Bank definition to adapt it to the changing global economy in
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the wake of globalization. The AfDB defines governance as “a process referring to the
manner in which power is exercised in the management of public affairs of a nation, and
its relations with other nations.”
It is important to note that the World Bank and AfDB definitions seem to put
more emphasis on the effectiveness of governments in delivering services to members of
their societies. However, as discussed by Keefer (2004), the broader concept of
governance should encompass the incentive structure that governs the actions of the
political actors. This is the issue of political and economic systems.
Earlier literature on economic development implicitly assumed that politicians
would make decisions that maximize society’s welfare. Dethier (1999) makes a point that
“governments are not benevolent dictators who seek to maximize social welfare, but
complex governance structures characterized by agency relationships.” Efficient use of
public resources depends not only on institutions (narrowly defined as organizational
structures), but also on incentive schemes within public organizations (Dethier 1999).
A broader definition of institutions was offered by North (1990) as “rules of the
game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction.” This broader definition provides for the incentive structure within the
decision making mechanism. Another definition that alludes to this more comprehensive
view of governance is provided in Kaufman and Kraay (2002).
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) define governance as the “traditions and institutions
by which authority is exercised in a country.” According to the authors, this includes the
process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and
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the state for institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. In
particular, the process by which governments are selected and monitored greatly impacts
the incentive structures within government organizations.
In sum, the effectiveness of governments in delivering services to their
populations is clearly not exogenous – it depends on the incentive structure, which in turn
depends on the selection and monitoring of key political and other decision makers. As
we will discuss later in the Chapter, the multiple dimensions of governance pose serious
empirical and theoretical challenges in studying the economic impacts of institutions or
quality of governance.

Differences in Political and Economic Institutions across Countries

One important line of inquiry in attempts to understand the economic effects of
governance should focus on the causes of differences in institutions across countries. In
other words, why do some countries have institutions that tend to be relatively inefficient
in regard to the provision of services to their citizens compared to other countries? Why
is corruption rampant in some countries and not in others? Why do we observe
differences in bureaucratic delays, protection of property rights, etc, across countries?
Recent literature in the area of economic development has attempted to answer some of
these questions. This section provides a brief review of some of this literature.
La Porta et al. (1999) discusses the role of colonial origins in explaining current
institutional differences. The authors observe that former British colonies have developed
better institutions that protect rights compared to former French, Portuguese, or Spanish
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colonies. Their findings are supported by other authors who find that British colonies
who have adopted common law legal systems (as opposed to the French codified civil
law) have better economic institutions (Landes 1998).5
Acemoglu, et al. (2001) employ a variant of this link between colonization and
current institutions or institutional quality. They look at “conditions in the colonies”
rather than the colonizer.6 The argument is that current institutions are a result of the
type of colonization – settler versus extraction. Settler colonies are those where the
European colonizers established settlements such as Australia, Canada, United States of
America, and New Zealand. On the other hand, extraction colonies are those where the
colonial powers extracted raw materials without establishing permanent settlements.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) attribute the choice of type of colonialism to conditions in
the colonies, which can be observed from the European settler mortality. Where settler
mortality was high, extraction type colonies were established. So, institutions for the
protection of property rights were not put in place. On the other hand, settler colonies
were characterized by institutions to protect property rights. The authors further argue
that this explains differences in current institutions because institutional quality tend to
persist.
Ndulu and O’Connell (1999) also point to historical reasons as a plausible
explanation for Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor political institutions. Beyond the colonial rule,
they discuss the post colonial epoch that was characterized by civilian authoritarian rule
in the 1960s and 1970s.7 This was followed by military dictatorships in the 1980s. They

5

See also Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2002)
See also Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004)
7
See also Mamdani (1996)
6

14
further argue that the adverse effects of these successive political events were amplified
by the impact of the cold war that resulted into “a fight for ideological control by the
major powers of the war” – the United States and the Soviet Union. This may, at least in
part, explain the current state of institutional development in these countries, and
therefore the level of economic performance.
The significance of the post colonial political events in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America, characterized by neo-patrimonial rule, can be related to the “social
conflict view” articulated in Acemoglu, et al. (2004) . According to this view, institutions
are chosen by those who control political power. The chosen institutions will therefore be
those that maximize the welfare of the politically powerful group and not society as a
whole.
However, we should note that, in the context of the discussion on post colonial
rule in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the emergence of neo-patrimonial rule is
believed to be a direct result of colonial institutions set to maximize the welfare of
colonial masters – a form of the “social conflict view.” Acemoglu, et al. (2004) also
discusses a number of other plausible reasons for differences in institutions across
countries. One of these reasons is what they called the “ideology view,” where wellintentioned political actors disagree on what institutions are good for their society. Due to
this uncertainty, “those societies that turn out to be right ex-post are the ones that
prosper.”
A number of other authors have linked institutional quality to variables like ethnolinguistic fractionalization (La Porta et al. 1999; Mauro 1995). Empirically, ethnic
fragmentation is commonly measured by the probability that any two randomly picked
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citizens belong to different ethnic groups. The hypothesis here is that highly
fractionalized societies will have poor institutions. What could be the reason for this?
One plausible answer to this question is that such societies are far less likely to agree on
any one set of institutions compared to more homogeneous societies. The second possible
explanation for this observation is that social conflicts are far more likely in ethnically
fragmented societies, and the politically strong groups will set up institutions to
maximize their own group welfare.8
Further, La Porta et al. (1999) find that countries that are poor and or have a high
proportion of Catholics or Muslims are associated with inferior government performance.
They measure government performance using measures of government intervention
(protection of property rights, business regulation, and taxation), efficiency of
government (bureaucratic delays, corruption, etc), output of public goods, and the size of
the public sector. The negative impact of catholic and Islam, they argue, could result
from “the use of religion for political purposes in Muslim and Catholic countries, and the
destructive competition between church and State in Catholic countries in particular.”
Such competition may have led to policies that are not conducive for the market to
operate efficiently.
Geography (altitude and climate) has also been linked to the quality of
institutions. Again, La Porta, et al. (1999) find that countries that are closer to the
equator exhibit inferior governments. One argument for this relationship, presented in
Hall (1999), relates latitude to “Western Influence,” which leads to better institutions.
However, the drawback in this argument, is that geography (measured as closeness to the
equator) may have a direct impact on per capita income, which in turn impacts
8

This is the “social conflict view” discussed in Acemoglu, et al. (2004)

16
institutional quality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Bloom et al. 1998). Warm
climate may be associated with lower productivity, and thus, lower incomes. Since
affluent societies are associated with superior institutions, the effect of geography on
institutional quality may actually be transmitted through income instead of closeness to
“Western Influence” as argued by Hall and Jones (1999).
Lastly, Knack (2000) examines the impact of aid dependence on the quality of
governance. He finds that “aid dependence undermines institutional quality by weakening
accountability, encouraging rent-seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control
of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures
to reform inefficient policies and institutions.” Although these findings are plausible,
there might be sample selection issues in the sense that aid-dependent countries are
normally poor and with inferior institutions. Knack (2000) tackles the potential reverse
causality issue by instrumenting aid using infant mortality in 1980, and initial GDP per
capita.

Theory of Institutions and Economic Performance

Although detailed research on the role of public governance in economic growth
and development is fairly recent, the importance of good governance was recognized
centuries ago as demonstrated in the following quote taken from one of Adam Smith’s
lectures.

17
“Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest
barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest
being brought about by the natural course of things (1755).”9
This long-recognized link did not take center-stage in the study of economic
development until about fifteen years ago, when the correlation between institutional
quality and economic performance became more apparent as demonstrated by Ndulu and
O’Connell (1999) for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. They observe that authoritarianism
is closely associated with poor economic performance. Good governance that allows for
participation of the citizens in the political process and the general running of public
affairs may be associated with a feeling of empowerment, which in turn may enhance
productivity.
In his Nobel Prize lecture, James Buchanan (1986) argued that economists should
look at the “constitution of economic polity to examine the rules and the constraints
within which political agents act.” He implicitly suggests that institutions are not
developed when their benefit exceeds the cost from the view point of the “common
good.”
In an attempt to answer the question of why some countries have institutions that
tend to retard economic growth, a great number of authors have examined the link
between political structures/institutions, economic institutions and economic
performance. Political theories suggest that institutions are shaped by those in power to
transfer resources to themselves (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004; La Porta et al.
1999). Acemoglu, et al. (2004) argue that groups with different interests will prefer
Lecture in 1755 (accessed in January 2006 at the Adam Smith Institute website:
http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/quotes.htm#jump1).

9
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different institutions, and the group that has more political power will ultimately decide
on what institutions will prevail.
The question we seek to examine in this section is how these institutions impact
economic outcomes. One of the answers could be the rent-seeking and state capture
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the politically powerful elite, whose interests
might be at odds with that of the general public, will engage in rent-seeking activities. As
such, they will not be willing to change the status quo.
As we will see later in this dissertation, rent-seeking and the quest to protect
future rents, may lead to inefficient allocation of resources from the social welfare
perspective. Further, resources are devoted to wasteful rent-seeking activities instead of
productive activities (Kimenyi and Tollison 1999).
Dethier (1999) argues that the “efficiency of the use of public resources depends
on incentive schemes of public organizations and that reform should focus on designing
schemes that ensure credible commitment and implementation of policies that maximize
social welfare.” Good governance improves human capital and efficiency in the use of
resources, which in turn enhances economic growth (Dethier 1999).
Political institutions design the legal system that defines the rules that govern
exchange. In a political process, different interest groups compete for political power or
economic rents within the framework of the rules defined by the legal system. Without an
appropriate incentive structure within political institutions, rules may be designed to
benefit particular groups with a political advantage at the expense of society as a whole.
Without basic legal protections – say of property rights, and against government
expropriation of private property, private investment growth is bound to decline and so
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will be per capita income growth. Private investment, especially foreign investment, is
also discouraged by poor quality bureaucracies that are susceptible to capture by interest
groups. This will in turn retard economic growth.
As far as democracy effects of growth are concerned, there seems to be no
conceptual or theoretical agreement on the nature and direction of the effect. In a
democratic political process, interest groups pressure policymakers to pursue policies that
favor these particular groups often at the expense of the general good if this enhances
their chance of retaining power through re-election. On the other hand, dictatorships may
pursue policies that favor interest groups that maintain them in power, and thus protect
their future rents. So, since no government is insulated from pressure from interest
groups, the question of which political regime will foster the rule of law, and economic
growth is theoretically unclear (Przeworski and Limogi 1993).

The Empirical Literature

As noted in the preceding section, theoretical studies do not offer unambiguous
answers to the question of whether good governance leads to better economic outcomes.
The specific case described above relates to the role of democratic institutions in
economic development. The theoretical literature provides evidence that democracies as
well as dictatorships are subject to pressure from rent-seeking interest groups. In either
case, rent-seeking impedes efficient allocation of resources, and may retard productivity
growth as more time and other productive resources are directed toward rent-seeking
activities.
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Further, as pointed out in earlier, governance is a multi-dimension concept that
encompasses the organization of social, economic, and political systems. For this reason,
it is reasonable to suspect that different dimensions of governance might have different
impacts on economic development. These limitations of theoretical analyses call for
empirical analyses as a complement not a substitute to theoretical analyses. So, in the
discussion that follows, we will explore some of the empirical work that has been done in
this area and the limitations or common problems encountered in these and similar
studies.
A big challenge in any empirical studies aimed at examining the impact of
governance is quantifying governance. Indeed, there is no perfect measure of quality of
governance. Numerous empirical studies have employed different subjective indicators of
governance that are based on various perception indexes. In some cases, objective proxies
(such as number of revolutions, political assassinations, democratic elections, etc) have
been used. A portion of the literature has focused on studying the impact of political and
institutional variables on levels of real per capita GDP, and a number of studies, on
economic growth.
The most frequently studied question is the role of democracy in economic
development. Most of the recent work has used indicators of political rights and civil
liberties compiled by Freedom House to measure the extent of democratization.10 Other
authors such as Barro (1991) have used measures of political instability and political
violence to study the impact of political variables on economic growth. Such proxies
10

Indexes of Political rights and civil liberties are published as “Freedom in the world country scores” by
Freedom house for a relatively big number of countries.
See http://www.freedomhouse.org/reseach/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm for details on the
methodology.

21
include the number of revolutions and military coups, and the number of political
assassinations.
Some authors have focused on measures of objective policy volatility. These
measures are based on the standard deviation of variables such as tax rates, monetary
variables and trade distortions as proxies for an uncertain policy framework (Kormedi
and Meguire 1985).
The other commonly used source of governance data is the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. The PRS group
is a commercial service that provides financial, economic and political risk assessment
for investors. The data consists of indicators of the risk of repudiation of contracts by
government, risk of expropriation of private investment, corruption in government, rule
of law, quality of bureaucracy, and ethnic tensions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2001; Knack and Keefer 1995).
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) compute six aggregate indicators of governance
from various perception indexes based on the various dimensions of governance. The
aggregate indicators are: (a) Voice and accountability, which measures citizens’
involvement in the selection of governments. (b) Political stability, which measures the
likelihood of the government in power being destabilized or overthrown through
unconstitutional means. (c) Government effectiveness, which combines perceptions of
the quality of public services, the quality of the bureaucracy, etc. (d) Regulatory quality,
which includes measures of incidence of “market-unfriendly” policies. (e) Rule of law,
which measures the extent to which agents abide by the rules of society. (f) Control of
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Corruption, which measures perceptions of corruption – defined as exercise of public
power for private gain.
Other studies have employed various individual indicators of quality of
governance. La Porta, et al. (1999) measures government performance using indexes of
government intervention into the market, which includes the property rights index (the
degree of legal protection of private property), and the business regulation index
(regulations relating to opening a business and keeping it open); government efficiency,
which includes measures of corruption, bureaucratic delays (red tape), tax compliance,
and the ratio of average government wages to GDP per capita; output of public goods,
which is measured by infant mortality, school attainment, literacy rates, and quality of
infrastructure; size of the public sector, which includes measures of the government
transfers and subsidies, government consumption, and an index of State-owned
enterprises.
Subjective measures, which are based on perceptions, are far from perfect. They
are subject to bias errors, and makes comparisons across time meaningful only when the
surveying methodology is the same across time. We think that some of the measures of
quality of governance used in La Porta, et al. (1999) may be misleading as they might be
measuring the quality of specific policies rather than the quality of governance in a broad
sense. An example is Cuba, with high literacy rates and an undemocratic system of
governance. This may have something to do with specific policies and not overall quality
of governance.
Given that the quality of governance is not measurable, empirical researchers
have no choice but to use indicators rather that actual measures of governance. However,
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indicators are prone to bias errors, which in turn may lead to biased empirical estimates
(Dethier 1999) . As such, results from any such empirical studies should be interpreted
with this drawback in mind.
Even if we assume that the indicators used are accurate measures of quality of
governance, there are still other empirical issues a researcher has to deal with. First, as
discussed in Dethier (1999), we cannot be sure that the measured effect of governance on
measures of economic performance is direct first order effect or second order or third
order. This calls for a deeper examination of potential channels through which the quality
of governance impacts economic performance. In our case, we will examine the impact
of governance on the composition of public expenditures as one plausible channel.
Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1997), using data from the World Bank’s
Operations Evaluation Department (OED), looked at the performance of Government
projects. They concluded that increased citizen voice and public accountability (enhanced
by civil liberties and democracy) results into greater efficacy in public action.
Further, empirical work studying the economic impacts of governance may be
faced with endogeneity problems. In other words unobserved factors that influence
economic performance may be correlated with indicators of governance. Unobserved
random shocks like unexpected military coups may affect both economic performance
and the quality of governance. Various studies have implemented instrumental variables
approach to deal with this problem (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Barro
1997; Levin and Renelt 1992). However, the big challenge with instrumental variables
estimation is obtaining valid instruments for quality of governance. Among the various
instruments used for institutional factors are measures of ethno-linguistic fragmentation
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in Mauro (1995) to instrument for corruption. However, if ethno-linguistic
fractionalization has a direct impact on economic performance, then it is not a valid
instrument for institutional factors in the growth equation.
As noted earlier, Hall and Jones (1999) use distance from the equator to
instrument for social infrastructure, arguing that latitude measures closeness to “western
influence” and thus better institutions. Acemoglu, et al. (2001) argues that these
instruments are invalid due to their direct impact on economic performance. So to study
the impact of institutional factors on levels of per capita GDP, they use European settler
mortality rates during the colonial era as an instrument for institutional quality. They
argue that the nature of institutions set up by the colonizers depended on whether they
could settle in the colonies or not. The decision to settle depended on the conditions in
the colony. Since institutions persist, they argue, settler colonies have better institutions.
They conclude that “once institutional quality is controlled for, countries closer to the
equator do not have lower incomes.”
Barro (1997) conducts a cross-country empirical study on the determinants of
growth. Two institutional factors – an index of democracy and an index of the rule of law
are used in the Barro (1997) study. The Democracy index used is the political rights
index compiled by “Freedom House.” The index measures the extent to which citizens
can participate meaningfully in the political process. The study concludes that there is a
nonlinear causal relation running from democracy to economic growth. This suggests that
“democracy raises growth when political freedoms are very low, but reduces growth after
a certain optimal level of freedom is reached.” The rule of law index used in Barro
(1997) is compiled by the Political Risk Services (PRS) and distributed as the
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International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The rule of law index is found to have a
positive and statistically significant causal effect on growth.
Another empirical problem related to the endogeneity of institutional variables,
especially in per capita growth regression equations as well as regressions of levels of
GDP per capita is simultaneity. Various studies have found evidence of reverse causality
running from economic performance to institutional measures such as democracy and the
rule of law (Chong and Calderon 2000; Kaufman and Kraay 2002b).
In particular, Kaufman and Kraay (2002b) find a strong and positive correlation
between per capita income and the quality of governance. Their empirical analysis break
this correlation into: 1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to
higher per capita incomes, and 2) a weak and negative causal relationship running from
per capita income to governance. They attribute the negative causal relation running from
per capita incomes to governance to “elite influence and state capture, which becomes
more prevalent as the country grows.” Kaufmann and Kraay (2002b), however, look at
levels of per capital income as opposed to growth. Their measures of governance are the
aggregate governance indicators compiled by the authors themselves.
Chong and Calderon (2000) on the other hand suggest that economic growth
enhances institutional quality by providing more resources to improve existing
institutions and their efficiency. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) use data consisting of a
pooled time series data set on 131 nations for the period 1972-1989. Their Granger
causality tests indicate that “economic development “causes” democracy but democracy
does not “cause” economic development.” This result is contrary to the conclusions of

26
Barro (1997), and Rivera-Batiz (2002) who find some positive growth effects of
democracy.
Rivera-Batiz (2002) argue that governance-improving democracy raises growth
through constraining actions of corrupt officials, which in turn stimulates technological
change and spurs economic growth. His empirical evidence suggests that democracy is a
significant factor in increasing total factor productivity growth between 1960 and 1990 in
a cross section of countries.
Some studies have focused on corruption as a proxy for quality of governance.
“Corruption, viewed in a broader governance framework, thrives when the state is unable
to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property and contractual rights, or provide
institutions that enforce the rule of law” (Hellman et al. 2000).
Earlier literature on the question of corruption and economic growth seemed to
support the view that corruption may enhance growth. This view is based on the
argument that corruption helps remove government-imposed rigidities.11 The more recent
literature, on the other hand, has provided evidence of negative growth effects of
corruption (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991).
These studies argue that corruption enhances fiscal deficits and constrains
government’s to impose appropriate regulatory controls that are aimed at correcting
market failures. Further, corruption distorts incentives in the sense that individuals spend
their time and energies on rent seeking and corrupt activities as opposed to productive
activities.
The above literature, for the most part, establishes a direct and positive link
between governance and economic growth. The positive causal relationship running from
11

See Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968).
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governance to economic growth could be attributed to constraints and limitations placed
on the actions of potentially corrupt officials, and to a feeling of empowerment and
participation that is believed to increase productivity.
However, we notice from the literature that conclusions from various studies vary
substantially, and the question of the direction of causation is not quite settled. We also
note that the relationship between governance and economic growth may be nonlinear as
suggested by Barro (1997).
The empirical study that we propose employs various indicators of governance as
opposed to the indicators of democracy and rule of law alone. We will analyze growth
effects of governance as opposed to analyzing levels of per capita income as in
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002b).12
In addition to the direct impact of governance on economic growth, some studies
have attempted to examine indirect growth effects of governance. It is argued that
institutional factors exert indirect growth effects through other variables such as capital
flows, business investment decisions, and trade policy.
Batra et al. (2003) utilize a set of enterprise data based on a survey of more than
10,000 firms to conclude that, among other factors, “the quality of governance matter
significantly in explaining a firm’s performance and investment behavior.” This finding
agrees with that of Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002), who find indirect growth effects of
some institutional variables. Based on data on 119 developing countries for the period
1970 through 1994, they estimate a system of growth, FDI and schooling equations. The
results from a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation suggest that the rule of law

12

More on this is in the empirical Chapters of the dissertation
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impacts economic growth through encouraging FDI and democracy impacts economic
growth through encouraging schooling.
In this study, we hypothesize that institutional factors affect economic growth
through the composition of public expenditures. Thus, we will show that the quality of
governance affects the composition of public expenditures, which potentially affects per
capita income growth rates.
Further, most studies on economic performance and institutional factors have
been cross-section studies. We employ panel data methods in our analysis, which
expands our sample information.

Governance and Composition of Public Expenditures

As indicated in the above survey, the literature on governance, and its impact on
economic performance, is broad and growing. However, most of the existing empirical
studies have focused on the total impact of governance on economic growth.13 In recent
years, a new strand of literature in this area has emerged. This new strand seeks to
explore the possible channels through which the quality of governance or institutions
impacts economic performance.
For instance, Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1997), using data from the World
Bank’s Operations evaluation Department (OED), looked at the performance of
Government projects. They concluded that “increased citizen voice and public
accountability results into greater efficacy in public action.” It is also argued that

13

See for example Barro (1997), Campos and Nugent (1999), Rodrik, et al. (2002), Nkurunziza and Bates
(2003), Acemoglu, et al. (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2004)
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institutional factors exert indirect growth effects through other variables such as capital
flows, business investment decisions, and trade policy (Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone
2003).
Gyimah-Brempong (2002), using a sample of African countries and corruption to
proxy for institutional quality, finds that corruption affects economic growth indirectly
through decreased investment in physical capital and in education. He also finds
corruption to be positively correlated with income inequality.
One of our goals in this study is to explore the impact of governance on allocation
of public expenditures. We believe that institutions and regulations that determine the
incentive structure in which economic agents operate affect allocation of public
resources. Our interest in this relationship is motivated, in part, by a number of studies
that find a significant effect of levels and composition of public expenditures on
economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Barro 1990; Bose, Haque, and Osborn
2003; Devaranjan, Swaroop, and Zou 1996).
Further, as noted in Chapter I, the World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews
(PERs) have identified patterns of “spending imbalances” in developing countries that
indicate a bias toward new capital investments, under-funding of non-wage operations
and maintenance, and overstaffed civil service. So, our interest is to find out if these
patterns are related to the country’s institutional quality, and try to explain how this
relationship might arise.
Dethier (1999) suggests that in the absence of good institutions, agents will likely
exploit discretionary power to misappropriate public resources for private gain. Theories
of rent-seeking (and rent extraction) and state capture by the elite are going to be our
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central link between the quality of governance and the composition of public
expenditures. Rent-seeking is defined as the “expenditure of scarce resources to capture
wealth transfers” (Buchanan 1980).
For the purposes of this study, rent-seeking would refer to expending resources to
influence public spending allocation. The extent of rent-seeking and the actual rents
extracted will depend on how vulnerable public institutions are to pressure from various
interest groups (Kimenyi and Tollison 1999). Strong institutions are less likely to “fall
prey” to pressures from firms or other interest groups (Pradhan 1996). Most rent-seeking
theories in public choice literature focus on western democratic systems. However, the
story might be different with autocratic regimes.
Rowley (1999), using examples of Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), discusses rent-seeking and rent extraction in Africa.
He traces the problem to colonial systems that were highly centralized and which were
maintained in the post-colonial structures. The colonial legacy had led to the so-called
“African socialism” with overreaching state control of the economy. Rent extraction
policies practiced in most countries included price and interest rate controls, regulation of
foreign exchange markets, import licensing, and selective taxation and subsidization
schemes (Rowley 1999).
Rowley further argues that these controls, coupled with the lack of
constitutionally guaranteed property rights, provided fertile ground for rent-extraction.
The implication of all this to allocation of public resources is that, we are likely to see
more spending on subsidies to government controlled corporations as a way of rewarding
the leader’s “inner circle.”
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Further, rent extraction is expected to lead to a bias in spending allocation in favor
of large capital projects as they may offer large rent-extraction opportunities. Rentseeking could explain the existence of “market-unfriendly” policies such as trade and
foreign exchange regulations that have led to too much government in the market and a
big and poorly paid civil service. This implies that in countries where such policies are
instituted, we are likely to see bigger bureaucracies and more public spending on wages
and salaries relative to other recurrent expenditures. Moreover, Kimenyi (1987) finds that
the size of the civil service increases with dictatorship.
The four African countries - Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and The Democratic
Republic of Congo - studied by Rowley (1999) were all found to have relatively low
levels of economic freedom based on indexes used in earlier studies.14 Political leaders
in these countries were associated with high levels of corruption – which took the form of
rent-extraction and even outright embezzlement.
A majority of studies on public expenditure have focused mainly on total
expenditures (Dudley and Montmarquette 1992; Preston and Ridge 1995; Ravallion
1982; Singh and Sahni 1984; Sinha 1998) and on individual components of public
expenditures (Gupta, Mello, and Sharan 2001; Sylwester 2000). However, a number of
other empirical studies have looked at the composition of expenditures (Arze Del
Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab 2005; Bose, Haque, and Osborn 2003; Fan and
Rao 2003; Mauro 1998; Sanz and Velázquez 2002; Sturm 2001; Tanzi and Davoodi
1997; Yildirim and Sezgin 2002). Our contribution in this study is to this strand of
literature that examines the composition of public expenditures.

14

Gwartney, et al. (1996); and a survey by Johnson, et al. (1998) . These resources are cited in Rowley
(1999) and have not been independently reviewed by the author.
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Arze, et al. (2005) examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the functional
composition of expenditures. Specifically, they examine expenditures on health and
education, and do not explicitly control for institutional differences across countries. Our
improvement to Arze et al. is that we control for institutional differences and we use
more disaggregated expenditures. In other words, we examine education and health
expenditures separately.
Sanz and Valazquez (2002) also do not explicitly control for differences in
institutional differences. They include country dummies to capture these effects.
However, given that their sample includes only OECD member countries, institutional
quality may not vary much across these countries.
Yildirim and Sezgin (2002), examine growth rates in education, health and
defense expenditures in Turkey for the period 1924-96. The main findings of their study
is that there are trade-offs between defense and welfare spending (health and education).
However, they too, did not control for institutional factors.
Fan and Rao (2003) examined both total expenditures and composition of public
expenditures using a sample of only developing countries. They estimate individual
equations for the various expenditure functions by region.15 They include a dummy
variable for structural adjustment programs, a one-year lag of government expenditure,
and a one-year lag of GDP per capita. Like Sanz and Valazquez (2002), they use country
dummies to capture the effect of other determinants of the composition of public
expenditures. Their main findings were that structural adjustment programs increased

15

Expenditure components include agriculture, education, health, social security, transportation and
communication, and defense. The regions are Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
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spending “on agriculture, education, and infrastructure in Africa; on agriculture and
health in Asia; and on education and infrastructure in Latin America”
Mauro (1998) finds that corruption reduces expenditures on education. He argues
that corrupt officials will choose to spend public resources on activities with greater
opportunities to extract bribes. Most spending on education (salaries, school materials,
etc) is clear-cut and does not allow government officials a great deal of discretion. Thus,
corrupt officials will design expenditure patterns that provide less spending in these
categories, and more spending on categories such as defense and big capital projects.
However, Mauro’s empirical work does not support the hypothesis that more corruption
leads to more spending on defense and public investment.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), on the other hand, find that “higher corruption is
associated with higher public investment, lower government revenues, lower
expenditures on operations and maintenance, and lower quality of public infrastructure.
They argue that corruption is likely to increase the number of large and more complex
public investment projects. This argument is in line with the rent-seeking hypothesis
discussed above. The main idea is that more complex expenditures cannot be easily
scrutinized by the media and the public in general and thus provides better opportunities
to extract rents in form of inappropriate commissions and bribes. The same argument
holds for defense spending which is usually shielded from public scrutiny allegedly for
“security reasons” (Gupta, Mello, and Sharan 2001).
Sturm (2001) employs panel data methods to explore the determinants of public
capital spending in less-developed countries. The study includes political and institutional
variables such as ideology, political cohesion, and political stability. The author finds no
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statistically significant impact of politico-institutional variables on public capital
spending.
We improve upon the studies surveyed above in a couple of ways. First, following
Yildirim and Sezgin (2002), we examine the functional composition of expenditures
using use the Zellner (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach. In other
words, we allow contemporaneous errors to be correlated across equations.16 However,
unlike Yildirim and Sezgin (2002), we examine the expenditure composition both across
countries and over time. Second, except for Sturm (2001), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997),
Mauro (1998), and Gupta et al. (2001), most of the studies surveyed above do not
explicitly control for institutional differences.
Finally, following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Arze et al. (2005) we
employ quasi-maximum likelihood methods and a log-odds ratio transformation approach
to empirically deal with the fractional dependent variables in our estimations.17

16
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See Chapter IV for details.
See Chapter IV for details.

CHAPTER III
THE THEORETICAL MODEL

In this Chapter we attempt to theoretically show a relationship between the quality
of governance and economic growth. We show that the overall impact of quality of
governance on economic growth is split between the “direct effect” and the “indirect
effect” through the composition of public spending18.
The model that we present is a representative agent model based on one
developed by Devaranjan, et al. (1996). The Devaranjan et al. model develops a link
between the composition of public expenditures and economic growth, and defines
“productive” and “unproductive” expenditures based on their effects on long-term growth
rates. In their framework, an expenditure is productive if it increases the long term
economic growth rate in per capita income. Devaranjan, et al. (1996) however, assumes
the composition of public expenditures to be exogenously determined by policy.
We modify the model in two ways: 1) we introduce the quality of governance in
the production function as an efficiency-enhancing parameter, together with a technology
term, and 2) the composition of public expenditures is assumed to depend on the quality
of governance.
We do recognize that government allocates expenditures to achieve various goals.
Economic growth may just be one of them. As Pradhan (1996) argues, “aggregate
18

We use “direct effect” to mean the effect of governance on economic growth that is transmitted through
channels other than the composition of public expenditures. “Indirect effect” will, henceforth refer to the
effect of governance on economic growth that is transmitted through the composition of public spending.
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spending should be allocated within and across sectors to maximize social welfare,
including the impact on the poor.” Indeed, there are expenditures that may increase social
welfare without any direct impact on the rate of economic growth. Such expenditures
include public spending on museums, leisure parks, theatres, sports activities, religious
activities, etc. Analytically, however, measuring social welfare is complicated. It’s even
much harder in a cross-country study involving countries with diverse preferences.
Economic growth is preferred in this study because it is easy to measure relative to other
goals of government and is comparable across countries. Thus, the assumption in this
study is that economic growth is welfare-enhancing.

The Behavior of Production Units

Per person production ( y ) in this model takes the form of a Cobb Douglas
production function, composed of private capital ( k ), two types of government
expenditures - g1 and g 2 , and a composite efficiency-enhancing term, V , as expressed in
equation (3.1) below:19

y = Vf (k , g 1, g 2) = Vk α g1β g 2γ

(3.1)

Where: α, β, γ ≥ 0; α + β + γ = 1; and following Martinez and McNab (2005), we define

V = Aψ as a product of technology, A , and a measure of quality of governance, ψ .
The parameters, α, β, and γ represent elasticities of output with respect to k , g1 ,
and g 2 respectively. We should also note that we use a broad definition of private capital
that includes both physical and human capital (Devaranjan, Swaroop, and Zou 1996).
19

Deveranjan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) use a CES specification for the production function.
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We also follow Devaranjan et al. (1996) in abstracting from issues of financing
public spending by assuming that the government runs a balanced budget. That is,

τy = g1 + g 2 = g

(3.2)

Where g is total government spending per person, and τ is the tax rate.
Let ϕ = ϕ (ψ ) be the proportion of g spent on g1 , then:
g1 = ϕg and g 2 = (1 − ϕ ) g .Where 0 < ϕ < 1 .

(3.3)

There is, however, a drawback with the use of the Cobb Douglas specification of
the production function. The share of total expenditures spent on any particular function
or type cannot be 0 or 1. This is because output per person, y would collapse to 0 with φ
= 0 or φ = 1. We, nonetheless, choose the Cobb Douglas specification due to its
tractability.

Consumption Behavior

The problem of the representative individual (given the government’s decision on
τ, and φ) is to maximize lifetime utility:
∞

− ρt

U = ∫ u (c ) e

dt ; where u ′ > 0, u ′′ < 0

(3.4)

0

Subject to:
•

k = (1 − τ ) y − c

(3.5)

Where c is consumption per person, k and y are as given in equation (3.1). In equation
(3.4), u (c) is the representative individual’s instantaneous utility and ρ is the discount
rate. A higher ρ implies that the individual values current consumption more than future
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consumption.20 Further, the first and second order derivatives of u (c) with respect to
current consumption (in equation 3.4) imply that the marginal utility of current
consumption is increasing at a decreasing rate.
The budget constraint in equation 3.5 indicates that, at any one time, the
individual divides his/her disposable income between consumption and savings. Thus the
rate of change in the capital stock (equal to savings in a closed economy) with respect to
time (denoted by k ) is simply the difference between disposable income ( (1 − τ ) y ) and
current consumption ( c ). Substituting equations 3.1 and 3.3 into 3.5 yields the following
budget constraint:
•

k = (1 − τ )Vk α (ϕg ) β ((1 − ϕ ) g ) γ − c

(3.6)

We follow common practice by using the functional form of the utility function
given in equation 3.7 with a constant elasticity of marginal utility.
u (c ) =

c 1−σ − 1
1−σ

(3.7)

Maximizing equation (3.4) subject to (3.6) yields the following.21
•

(1 − τ )Vαk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ ) − ρ
c
= µ =
c
σ

(3.8)

Equation (3.8) represents the rate of growth in consumption or the steady state growth
rate.

20
21

See Romer (1996)
See Appendix A for details

39
The Impact of Governance (ψ ) on the Rate of Growth ( µ )

Recall that the composition of expenditures, ϕ , is a function of the quality of
governance, ψ . That is:

µ = f (V , ϕ ) and ϕ = ϕ (ψ )
→

(3.9)

dµ dµ dV dµ dϕ
=
×
+
×
dψ dV dψ dϕ dψ

(3.10)

In our framework, equation (3.10) represents the impact of governance on the rate
of growth. The first term on the right-hand side is the growth effect of governance
through efficiency enhancement and the second term indicates the growth effects of
governance via the composition of public expenditures.
From equation (3.8),
dµ (1 − τ )αk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ )
=
dV
σ

(3.11)

dV
= Aψ ψ + A
dψ

(3.12)

(1 − τ )V α k (α −1) g ( β + γ )
dµ
=
[(1 − ϕ ) γ βϕ
σ
dϕ

( β −1 )

− ϕ β γ (1 − ϕ ) ( γ −1) ]

dϕ
= ϕψ
dψ
Thus,

(3.13)

(3.14)

dµ
is given by:
dψ

dµ (1 − τ )αk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ )
=
× ( Aψ ψ + A) +
dψ
σ
(1 − τ )Vαk (α −1) g ( β +γ )

σ

γ

[(1 − ϕ ) βϕ

( β −1)

β

− ϕ γ (1 − ϕ )

( γ −1)

(3.15)

] × ϕψ
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→

⎡
⎛β
γ ⎞ ⎤
dµ
A
⎟⎟ϕψ ⎥
= (1 − τ )αk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ ) ⎢( Aψ ψ + A) + ψA⎜⎜ −
dψ σ
⎝ ϕ (1 − ϕ ) ⎠ ⎦
⎣

(3.16)

Equation 3.16 represents the total effect of quality of governance on long run
growth. The same equation also shows that the total effect is made up of the “direct
effect” (i.e. the effect of governance on the rate of growth that is transmitted through
channels other than the composition of public expenditures), and the “indirect effect,”
which is transmitted through the composition of public expenditures.
We also note that the sign of this total impact depends on the sign of the bracketed
term. The first term in the brackets ( Aψ ψ + A ) is positive. By assumption, the measure of
quality of governance (ψ ) is positive, and so is the level of technology ( A ). We also
assume that the change in the level of technology with respect to changes in the quality of
governance is positive (i.e. Aψ > 0 ). This later assumption is based on the fact that better
institutions (which include effective protection of property rights, copyright laws, and a
low risk of expropriation of private property) may encourage innovations and transfer of
technology through foreign direct investment.
The second term in the brackets has three components. The first one ( Aψ ) is
positive based on the assumptions on A andψ . The sign of the second component
⎛β
γ ⎞
⎜⎜ −
⎟⎟ is indeterminate. That is,
⎝ ϕ (1 − ϕ ) ⎠

⎛β
β
ϕ
γ ⎞
⎜⎜ −
⎟⎟ >0 if
>
. In other words,
γ (1 − ϕ )
⎝ ϕ (1 − ϕ ) ⎠

the ratio of relative elasticities ( β , γ ) is greater than the ratio of relative shares of g1
and g 2 in total spending. This implies that the impact of a change in ϕ on the rate of
growth depends not only on the productivity of g1, but also on the initial shares of total
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spending allocated to the two types of expenditures (Devaranjan, Swaroop, and Zou
1996).

The Link between Governance and the Composition of Public Expenditures

Our main interest is in the sign of the last component of the second term in the
brackets ( ϕψ ) in equation 3.16. This term measures the effect of quality of governance on
the composition of public expenditures. We argue that the sign of this effect depends on
the type of expenditures denoted by g1 and g 2 .
For simplicity, let’s continue to assume that there are two types of expenditures –
one type that is susceptible to rent extraction by the decision-maker ( g1 ), and the other
that is less (or not) susceptible to rent extraction ( g 2 ) . The literature suggests that the first
category might include spending on defense and public investment. This hypothesis
follows from the fact that these expenditures – defense spending and public capital
investment – tend to be more complex, less transparent, and thus not exposed to public
scrutiny.
On the other hand, category two – expenditures less susceptible to rent extraction
– might include education and health expenditures. These expenditures are more direct
and often fixed for a relatively long period of time. For example, employee salaries, or
classroom equipment are easier to verify compared to expenditures on big public
investment projects such as energy plants , major highways, etc. The same is the case for
military equipment.22
22

See for example, Mauro (1998) , and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)
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However, good and or democratic institutions place a constraint on decisionmakers as to the extent of rent extraction. In other words, the degree of venality depends
on the quality of institutions. Elected officials operating in a democratic and transparent
environment would allocate resources, to a bigger extent, to maximize social welfare as
this increases the likelihood of re-election. On the other hand, in a less democratic and
less transparent system, political power does not derive from competitive elections, and
thus social welfare maximization is likely to be a secondary or tertiary objective of
decision-makers. Maximizing rents will likely be the main objective.
Thus, if g1 and g 2 are as defined above, and ϕ is the share of g1 in total
expenditures, then, from equation (3.16), ϕψ < 0 . With weak institutions, the opportunity

cost of extracting rents (in terms of the likelihood of losing political power) is low. As
such, public spending will likely be biased towards those expenditure types or functions
that maximize rents rather than social welfare. On the other hand, if we define ϕ as the
share of g 2 in total public spending, and g 2 is as described above, then we should
expect ϕψ > 0 . This would imply that with better quality institutions (characterized, for
instance, by democracy and transparency), the decision-making authority will seek to
maximize social welfare. Thus public spending will be biased toward expenditure types
and/or functions that maximize social welfare.
For a more formal illustration of the propositions in the preceding discussion, let’s
assume that the government (decision-maker) maximizes the following utility function23.
VGOV = ψU M + (1 − ψ ) R

Subject to: τy = g1 + g 2 = g
23

This form of the government utility function is obtained from Panizza (1999).

(3.17)
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Where U M is the utility of the median voter or a representative consumer in the country,
and R are the rents extracted by the decision-maker. For simplicity, we assume rents can
only be extracted from expenditure type g1 , while the median voter derives utility from
government expenditure type g 2 .
A simple interpretation of the utility function in equation 3.17 is that with the
lowest quality of governance (ψ = 0) , decision makers will not care about the utility of
the median voter and will therefore allocate the entire public budget to g1 in order to
maximize rents. On the other hand, with the highest quality of governance (ψ = 1) , the
decision maker allocates the entire public budget to g 2 in order to maximize social
welfare. This is of course a highly simplified case since, in practice, some spending on g1
could enter into the median voter’s utility function, and some spending on g 2 might also
be subject to rent extraction. However, we believe that although this simplification will
likely affect the magnitude of the bias toward one expenditure type or the other, our main
propositions about the direction of the bias in allocation of public expenditures between
g1 and g 2 should still hold.

The quality of governance (ψ ) is assumed to lie between zero and one. Rents (R)
are a certain proportion (θ ) of g1

24

.

That is:
R = θg 1

(3.18)

U M = g 2a c d

(3.19)

For simplicity, we take θ as given (exogenous). However, in practice, this ratio of rents to expenditures
might also be dependent on the quality of governance.

24
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Where c is personal consumption, 0 ≺ a, d ≺ 1 , and a + d = 1
Substituting 3.18 and 3.19 into 3.17 yields,
VGOV = ψg 2a c d + (1 − ψ )θg1

(3.20)

Maximizing 3.20 with respect to g1 and g 2 subject to the balanced budget constraint
given above (also in equation 3.2), we obtain the optimal values of g1 and g2 as follows.
1

⎛ θ (ψ − 1) ⎞ ( a −1)
⎟
g1 = yτ − ⎜⎜ −
d ⎟
⎝ aψ c ⎠

(3.21)

1

⎛ θ (ψ − 1) ⎞ ( a −1)
⎟
g 2 = ⎜⎜ −
d ⎟
⎝ aψ c ⎠

(3.22)

Our interest is the effect of quality of governance on g1 and g 2 . We therefore take
derivatives of g1 and g 2 (in equations 3.21 and 3.22 respectively) with respect toψ .
1

⎛ θ (ψ − 1) ⎞ ( a −1)
dg1
1
⎟
×
<0
= −⎜⎜ −
d ⎟
(a − 1)(ψ − 1)ψ
dψ
⎝ aψ c ⎠

(3.23)

1

dg 2 ⎛ θ (ψ − 1) ⎞ ( a −1)
1
⎟
×
>0
= ⎜⎜ −
d ⎟
(a − 1)(ψ − 1)ψ
dψ ⎝ aψ c ⎠

(3.24)

Equations 3.23 and 3.24 show the effect of quality of governance on the two
expenditure functions or types. Equation 3.23 shows that expenditure on g1 goes down
with an improvement in the quality of governance, which implies that less weight is
attached to maximizing rents and more to social welfare. Equation 3.24, on the other
hand, shows the opposite of the relationship in equation 3.23.
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Summary of the Theoretical Analysis

In summary, we have determined that the magnitude and size of the total effect of
quality of governance on long run growth is theoretically indeterminate due to the several
potential channels through which this effect is transmitted. In this simple model we
examined one of the potential transmission channels – the composition of public
expenditures. We show, theoretically, that some expenditure types are relatively more
susceptible to rent extraction than others and are therefore likely to be favored by rentseeking decision-makers in the absence of effective checks and balances.
Further, as suggested by Devaranjan et al. (1996), the effect of changes in the
composition of expenditures on growth also depends on the initial composition. For
example, Devaranjan et al.(1996) show that capital spending in developing countries has
a negative impact on growth because these countries are already spending more than
“optimal” on public investment. This finding agrees with the World Bank Public
expenditure reviews in developing countries. This theoretical ambiguity surrounding the
role of governance in development makes the case for an empirical analysis.
In Chapter IV we develop an empirical methodology to estimate the growth effect
of governance (expressed in equation 3.16) and provide the empirical results in Chapter
V. In addition to estimating the growth effects of governance, we estimate the effect of
quality of governance on various public expenditure functional categories (i.e. ϕψ ) and on
the share of capital expenditures in total public expenditures to investigate the potential
indirect effects of governance through the composition of public expenditures.

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

In this Chapter, we develop an empirical methodology for analyzing various
aspects of the direct and potential indirect growth effects of governance. First, we
examine the total (direct plus indirect) growth effect of quality of governance. We will
use a number of indicators of governance to estimate the effect of quality of governance
on economic growth. Using several indicators of governance allows us to capture the
growth effects of the different aspects or dimensions of governance. For example, we
could have a democracy with high corruption or an inefficient bureaucracy. As
previously indicated, we will do a sub-sample regression analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa
due to its less developed status and the fact that it has had more political and institutional
problems in the recent decades.
Further, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach in an attempt to
separate the direct and indirect growth effects of governance. We include measures of
expenditure composition among other control variables in the growth model in order to
estimate the growth effects of governance channeled through mechanisms other than
expenditure composition. We instrument for the various expenditure categories
(education, health, and defense) using demographic variables.
The share of the population below 14 years of age is used to instrument for the
share of education in total public expenditure. The share of total population between the
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ages of 15 and 64 is used as an instrument for the share of defense spending in total
public spending. It is argued that most rebellious activities against governments are done
by middle-aged individuals, which may necessitate more defense spending. Lastly, the
proportion of the total population 65 years and older is used as an instrument for the share
of health spending in total spending.
In addition to the 2SLS, we use the system GMM estimator that uses “internal
instruments” for the endogenous variables in the presence of a persistent dependent
variable such of growth in per capita GDP and also because of lack of good instruments
for endogenous explanatory variables.25
In the second section of the Chapter, we develop a methodology to analyze
potential indirect effects of quality of governance through the composition of public
expenditure. We estimate a set of seemingly unrelated equations with functional
categories of public expenditure as dependent variables. The functional categories
analyzed are public expenditure on health as a share of total expenditure, public
expenditure on education as a share of total expenditure, and defense expenditure as a
share of total expenditure. We also estimate the impact of governance on the share of
capital expenditure to investigate any effects of quality of governance on the composition
of expenditures by “economic type.” This is a separate regression model and is not part of
the seemingly unrelated system of equations because it’s based on a different
classification of public expenditures.26

25
26

More on this is discussed later in the Chapter.
Classification of public expenditures is also discussed later in the Chapter.
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Income Growth Rate and Quality of Governance

The empirical growth model that we estimate in this dissertation follows the
neoclassical growth model estimated by earlier researchers such as Barro (1991) and
Mankiw, et al. (1992) with some extensions. Following more recent growth studies
(Barro 1997; Gyimah-Brempong 2002), we include indicators of quality of governance as
additional determinants of the rate of growth in real per capita income.
The neoclassical growth model, developed by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1959), and
Swan (1965) emphasized the convergence property – the lower the starting level of real
per capita income, the higher the growth rate in per capita output – and most empirical
work that followed the development of these models tends to support it.
As Barro (1997) explains, “in the neoclassical model, the steady-state capital per
worker and output depend on a number of environmental and choice factors such as
propensity to save, population growth rate, etc.” Due to cross-country variations in these
factors, the convergence is conditional.
The new endogenous growth theories have incorporated technological progress
and R&D into the growth model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Romer 1990). These
relatively new extensions highlight the role of government in the growth process. Actions
of government regarding infrastructure development, regulation of international trade and
other aspects of the private business sector, maintaining the rule of law, and the
development of the financial markets can have significant effects on the growth process.
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The model we estimate in this study is within the framework of these extensions
to the neoclassical growth model. In addition to the “traditional” determinants of growth,
we include indicators of institutional quality and political freedoms as determinants of
variations in growth, and potential explanations for variation in per capita income growth
rates across countries.
Based on this background, the growth equation that we estimate can be expressed
as follows:
gdppcgit = β 0 + β1igdppcit + β 2 investit + β 3 exp ort it + β 4 schoolit + β 5 govconit + β 6 govit + u it
(4.1)

Where gdppcg is the annual growth rate in real per capita output; igdppc is the initial
level of per capita GDP; invest is total domestic investment as a percentage of GDP;
school is the average years of schooling for the population 15 years or older.
Export is the rate of export growth; govcon is general government final consumption

expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which includes all government current expenditure
for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also
includes most expenditure on national defense and security and excludes government
military expenditure; gov is an indicator of quality of governance or institutions; and u it
is the error term.
We expect a negative relationship between igdppc and the rate of growth in per
capita output based on the convergence hypothesis described above. Based on the
existing growth literature, we expect export, invest, and school to have a positive causal
relationship with the rate of growth in per capita output, and govcon to have a negative
impact on growth in per capita real output (Barro 1991, 1997; Levin and Renelt 1992).

50
We also expect lower quality of governance to have a negative impact on growth in per
capita real output (Barro 1997).
More exports imply an expanding market for domestically produced goods and
thus lead to higher employment and income per capita. Private investment increases the
amount of physical capital per worker and overall production capacity. Further,
investment in better technology leads to higher productivity and higher per capita
income.
The variable school captures the level of education, which reflects the quality of
the labor force. Better education makes it easier to adopt new technologies and to be
innovative. Further, better education is associated with a more flexible workforce in
terms of acquiring new skills as new sectors of the economy emerge. All this can be
associated with higher productivity and, therefore, high growth rates in per capita GDP.
It is important to note that there are concerns about the right specification of the
growth equation. In other words, what right-hand-side variables belong in the model?
The literature on economic growth has identified a big number of variables that are
believed to be partially correlated with growth. However, the question of the robustness
of these correlations is an important one. Different researchers have employed different
combinations of right-hand-side variables.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) conducts a robustness check study with 59 explanatory
variables that had been found significant in other studies. He finds 22 of the 59
explanatory variables to be significant. A more recent study by Sala-i-Martin, et al.
(2004) reaches a similar conclusion. In this recent study, Sala-i-Martin, et al. (2004)
conclude that about “one-fifth of the 67 variables used in the analysis can be said to be
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significantly related to growth, while several more are marginally related to growth.”
Some of the significant variables in Sala-i-Martin, et al. (2004) include investment price,
fraction of tropical area, dummies for East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America,
primary schooling at the beginning period (1960), GDP per capita (1960), Spanish
colony, fraction Muslim, number of years with an open economy, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, etc.
However, there should be concerns about the likely multicollinearity among righthand-side variables. Due to these concerns, we do not include all the variables that have
been found to be significantly related to growth in equation (4.1). For instance, La Porta,
et al. (1999) finds that closeness to the equator; religious ideology, ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity, and historical (or colonial) background have an impact on the quality of
governance. Since we include an indicator of the quality of governance, we believe that
inclusion of some of these geographic and demographic variables would lead to
multicollinearity and biased standard errors of parameter estimates. We do however
include some key variables suggested in Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004), although with some variations in the measurement of the variables.

Estimation Methodology

We choose a number of empirical estimation procedures, partly for the purpose of
checking the robustness of the results to different econometric model specifications, and
partly as an attempt to deal with some of the econometric issues such as endogeneity.
First, we estimate Equation 4.1 using the Fixed Effects and the Random Effects
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procedures. Second, we estimate the growth equation using the dynamic panel system
GMM estimator.

Fixed effects and random effects27

The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inefficient in the presence of
unobserved individual specific effects and inconsistent if the individual effects are
correlated with any of the regressors. Some panel data methods – random effects (RE) or
fixed effects (FE) estimation procedures – are designed to remedy some of these

shortcomings. Below, we provide a brief exposition of these two estimators.
Let
y it = β i xit + ci + u it

t = 1,2,..., T

(4.2)

Where y it is the dependent variable, xit is a vector of explanatory variables, ci is the
unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects, and u it is a vector of idiosyncratic
disturbances.
The random effects model assumes that the country-specific effects, ci are
uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, xit , and combines the country-specific effects
with the error term to form a composite disturbance term ( ci + u it ). However, the
composite errors are serially correlated due to the existence of the time-invariant
unobserved effects in the error term. The random effects procedure uses the generalized
least squares (GLS) estimation procedure to deal with this serial correlation problem. If in

27

This discussion is heavily based on Wooldridge (2002)
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fact individual-specific effects are correlated with any of the explanatory variables, the
random effects estimates are inconsistent.
The random effects estimator is given by:
−1

βˆ

RE

N
⎛ N
ˆ −1 X ⎞⎟ ⎛⎜ ∑ X 'Ω
ˆ −1 y ⎞⎟
= ⎜ ∑ X i'Ω
i
i
i
⎠
⎠ ⎝ i =1
⎝ i =1

(4.3)

The fixed effects model, on the other hand, assumes arbitrary correlation between
the country-specific effects, ci and the observed explanatory variables ( x ). The fixed
effects estimation simply employs OLS estimation on a modified version of the basic
model shown in (4.2) above. This fixed effects transformation is done by first averaging
equation (4.2) over t = 1,2,..., T
That is, yi = xi β + ci + ui

(4.4)

T

T

T

t =1

t =1

t =1

Where; yi = T −1 ∑ yit , xi = T −1 ∑ xit , and ui = T −1 ∑ uit
We subtract equation (4.4) from equation (4.2) to obtain the following fixed effects
transformed equation.
yit − yi = ( xit − xi ) β + (uit − ui )

(4.5)

This transformation “sweeps out” the individual (unobserved) specific effect.
Equation (4.5) can then be estimated by OLS to obtain consistent estimates of the
parameter vector, β . Equation (4.5) is simply an estimating equation. All inference is
based on equation (4.2).
One drawback of the fixed effects estimator is that the fixed effects
transformation also “sweeps out” any observable time-invariant explanatory variables.
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For example, we cannot have regional dummy variables or measures of ethnic
fractionalization among the explanatory variables.
We conduct the Hausman (1978) specification test to compare the appropriateness
of the fixed effects model relative to the random effects model. The test is based on the
difference between RE and FE estimates. Under the null hypothesis, unobserved
individual effects are uncorrelated with observed explanatory variables. Both the random
effects and the fixed effects are consistent but the random effect is efficient. This implies
that a statistically significant difference between the two estimators is evidence against
the nonexistence of correlation between the country-specific unobserved effects and the
observed explanatory variables as assumed by the random effects model (Wooldridge
2002). This would support the fixed effects model against the random effects.
If βˆ FE is an M × 1 vector of fixed effects estimates, and βˆ RE is an M × 1 vector
of random effects estimates, then the Hausman statistic, H, can be computed as follows.

H = ( βˆ FE − βˆ RE )′[ AVˆar ( βˆ FE ) − AVˆar ( βˆ RE )] −1 ( βˆ FE − βˆ RE ) and is asymptotically
distributed as χ

2

under the null hypothesis, where A var(.) denotes the asymptotic

M

variance.
The Hausman test conducted on a baseline specification of (4.1) generates a
highly significant test statistic. We therefore reject the null hypothesis of no correlation
between the country-specific unobserved effects and the observed explanatory variables.
This result suggests using a fixed effects model. However, for completeness, we also
estimate a random effects model.
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Endogeneity
In terms of the growth equation outlined in equation (4.1), we suspect that the
error process is correlated not only with the growth rate in income per capita, but also
some right hand-side variables such as investment, export growth, and the quality of
governance. Such unobserved factors might include interest rate shocks, unexpected
political events such as military coups, etc.
The consistency of parameter estimates from the two estimators – random effects,
and fixed effects – discussed above is based on the assumption that the error term is
uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. However, the problem of endogenous
explanatory variables in the growth equation is a well established finding in the growth
literature. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, we employ the Hausman (1978)
specification test to test for endogeneity in equation (4.1).
The Hausman test examines the difference between two estimators given
by D =

NT ( β IV − β LS ) .

Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, both estimates are consistent and D = 0 .
However, under the alternative hypothesis D ≠ 0.
The Hausman test statistic is distributed χ 2 and is computed as:

H = ( β c − β e )' (Vc − Ve ) −1 ( β c − β e )

(4.6)

Where β c is the coefficient vector from the consistent estimator; β e is the coefficient
vector from the efficient estimator; Vc is the covariance matrix for the consistent
estimator; and Ve is the covariance matrix for efficient estimator.
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Table E5 (in the appendix) provides some results of the Hausman tests for
endogeneity of investment, schooling, government consumption, the growth rate of
exports, and an indicator of quality of governance (index of political freedom). The
results confirm that investment as a percentage of GDP and the rate of growth in exports
are endogenous in growth. However, tests statistics for schooling, general government
consumption, and the quality of governance as measured by an index of political freedom
are not statistically significant. The instruments used to construct the tests are the lagged
values of the variables. For example, the lagged values of the variable invest are used to
instrument for investment as a percentage of GDP.
It’s important to note that the validity of the Hausman test results depends on the
validity of instruments used in the test. Due to this caveat, we do not solely rely on the
results of the Hausman tests in Table E5. To our knowledge, there are no typical
instruments in the literature for most of the right-hand-side variables in equation (4.1). As
such, we rely more on theory and anecdotal evidence provided in the literature to
determine what right-hand-side variables in equation (4.1) might be endogenous. For
example, random shocks such as unexpected military coups might affect private
investment, quality of governance, government consumption, exports, and the rate of
growth in per capita GDP. If this is the case, then all these right-hand-side variables
might be correlated with the error term and thus endogenous. As mentioned above,
failure to remedy this problem leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters.
Although not much attention was paid to this issue in earlier growth studies,
recent economic growth literature (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Bond, Hoeffler, and
Temple 2003; Gyimah-Brempong 2002) has employed newly developed instrumental
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variable techniques to deal with endogeneity problems in growth empirical studies. These
estimation techniques are based on dynamic panel data methods developed by Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) , Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998). In this
study, we follow the framework developed in these studies and others that have applied
these techniques to growth equations to estimate equation (4.1). A brief description of
these methods is provided below.

Dynamic panel GMM estimation28

Both the random effects and the fixed effects estimates are inconsistent in the
presence of a persistent dependent variable and endogenous regressors. As noted earlier,
based on the Hausman test, theory, and anecdotal evidence in the literature, right-handside variables in equation (4.1) are correlated with the random error term. This leads to
inconsistent fixed and random effects estimates. For this reason, in addition to the fixed
and random effects estimators, we conduct an instrumental variable estimation developed
by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond
(1998), which allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the growth equation in the
presence of dynamics and endogenous explanatory variables. Following is a brief
description of the basic approach29.
The approach involves writing equation (4.1) as a dynamic panel data model, and
first difference the dynamic equation to get rid of the individual specific effects. We then

28

This section draws heavily on the work of Arellano and Bond (1991); Baum et al. (2003); Bond et al.
(2003); Loayza et al. (2000); and Rioja and Valev (2004).
29
See details in Appendix B
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instrument the differenced right-hand-side variables with appropriately lagged levels
(Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 2003). Let the growth equation take the following form:

yit = αyi ,t −1 + xit′ β + ci + vit

for i = 1,...N and t = 2,...T

(4.7)

Where yit represents the rate of growth in real per capita GDP; xit represents variables that
potentially affects the rate of growth; and ci is a set of unobserved, time-invariant,
country specific effects. We first-difference equation (4.7) to eliminate the country
specific effect, ci . Thus:

yit − yi ,t −1 = α ( yi ,t −1 − yi ,t − 2 ) + ( xit − xi ,t −1 )′β + (vit − vi ,t −1 )

(4.8)

By construction, the differenced lag of the growth rate ( yi ,t −1 − yi ,t − 2 ) in equation
(4.8) is endogenous. Further, as noted earlier, X contains endogenous variables.
Therefore, we need instruments to consistently estimate equation (4.8). On the
assumption that the error terms in (4.7) are serially uncorrelated, i.e. E (vit vis ) = 0 , the
following moment conditions yield appropriate instruments for the differenced lagged
dependent variable and endogenous explanatory variables.

E[ yi ,t − s ∆vit ] = 0 for t = 3,..., T and s ≥ 2

(4.9)

E[ xi ,t − s ∆vit ] = 0 for t = 3,..., T and s ≥ 2

(4.10)

The moment conditions in equations (4.9) and (4.10) allow us to use suitably
lagged levels as instruments for the first differenced endogenous variables. However,
when lagged levels of the series are weakly correlated with subsequent first-differences,
the Arellano and Bond (1991) differenced GMM estimator has been found to have a
small sample bias problem (Blundell and Bond 1998).
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To deal with the potential bias in the differenced GMM estimates, Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed an estimator that makes use of
additional information in levels. This relatively new estimator is referred to as the system
GMM estimator. This approach combines two sets of equations - one set in firstdifferences and another in levels – into a system of equations. This introduces additional

T − 2 linear moment restrictions given by:
E[(ci + vit )∆yi ,t −1 ] = 0

(4.11)

E[(ci + vit )∆xi ,t −1 ] = 0

(4.12)

The system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in equations 4.9, 4.10,
4.11, and 4.12 to consistently estimate the parameters of interest in equation (4.7).
It should be noted that valid instruments should be correlated with the included
endogenous explanatory variable and, at the same time, orthogonal to the error term. To
ensure the validity of the instruments, we conduct the Hansen (1982) test for overidentifying restrictions to jointly test the appropriateness of the instruments. The null
hypothesis for the test is that the instruments are valid in that they are uncorrelated with
the errors. Under the null, the test statistic has a χ (2L − k ) distribution, where L is the
number of instruments and k is number of parameters in the model30.
Further, as noted earlier, the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the
assumption of white noise errors in the levels equation. If in fact the errors are serially
correlated, the GMM estimator will lose its consistency. We thus test for second-order
autocorrelation in the differenced equation. The test statistic developed by Arellano and

30

See Appendix B for details.
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Bond (1991) is given in appendix B. By construction, we should expect the presence of
first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced equation.

The “direct” versus “indirect” growth effects of governance

As earlier mentioned, we do a 2SLS estimation in an attempt to separate the
growth effects of governance that are transmitted through channels other than
expenditure composition (referred to in this dissertation as the direct effect) and the
indirect effects of governance that are channeled through the composition of public
expenditures. These “direct” channels could include changes in productivity resulting
from changes in the quality of governance. It is argued that good governance encourages
citizen participation in the development efforts of a country, which in turn increases
productivity.
First, we estimate the direct effect of quality of governance (gov) on economic
growth by controlling for the indirect effect (through the composition of public
expenditures.
That is,
4

gdppcg it = β 0 + β 1 govit + β j ∑ Expcompitj + β 5 X it + ε it

(4.13)

j =2

Where gdppcg is the growth rate in real per capita GDP; gov is a measure of quality of
governance (we use an index of freedom for this); Expcomp is the share of each
expenditure component (education, health, and defense), and X is a vector of other
control variables in the growth equation.
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To tease out the indirect effect, we need “first-stage” estimates. We instrument for
the share of education expenditure using the proportion of the total population below 14
years of age. We use the proportion of the total population 65 years and older and the
fertility rate as instruments for the share of health expenditure in total public spending;
and the proportion of the total population between the ages of 15 and 64 to instrument for
the share of defense spending in total public expenditures.
Thus, the three first-stage equations take the following form.
Educit = α 0 + α 1 govit + α 2 X itj + ζ it
Healthit = δ 0 + δ 1 govit + δ 2 X itj + ν it

(4.14)

Defenseit = σ 0 + σ 1 govit + σ 2 X itj + ω it

Where Xitj includes identifying instrument(s) for expenditure share j (j ≡ education
expenditure share, health expenditure share, defense expenditure share)
To obtain the total effect (direct plus indirect), we substitute for Expcomp in
equation (4.13) using equations (4.14) and take the derivative of gdppcg with respect to
gov to obtain the following.

∂ ( gdppcg )
= β1 + (β 2 × α 1 + β 3 × δ 1 + β 4 × σ 1 )
∂ ( gov )

(4.15)

In this framework, the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (4.15), β 1 , is
the growth effect of governance that is transmitted through channels different from the
composition of expenditures (direct effect). On the other hand, the indirect effect of
governance that is channeled through the composition of expenditures if represented by
the term in parenthesis in equation (4.15).
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Quality of Governance and the Composition of Public Expenditure.

In this section of the Chapter, we explore the potential effects of quality of
governance on allocation of public expenditure. This analysis is important for two main
reasons. One, a number of studies have shown a direct relationship between the
composition of public expenditure and economic growth (Bose, Haque, and Osborn
2003; Devaranjan, Swaroop, and Zou 1996; Sylwester 2000). All these studies treat the
composition of expenditure as exogenous. Our goal in this section is to look at some of
the determinants of the composition of public expenditure with particular interest in the
quality of governance. Establishing this link between governance and the composition of
public expenditure suggests potential indirect growth effects of governance via the
composition of public expenditure.
The second main reason for this analysis relates to policymaking. Many
developing countries, under the direction of international financial agencies (notably the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), have embarked on comprehensive
public sector reforms. Among the many reforms, there has been an effort to transform
institutions of government, and re-examination of budgetary processes through public
expenditure reviews. If a link between the quality of institutions and the composition of
public expenditure is established, then resources could be better utilized by focusing on
institutional reforms that would in turn lead to a more appropriate allocation of public
spending given a country’s social, economic, and political situation.
We look at both the functional composition of public expenditure and the
composition by economic characteristics of the expenditure (capital versus recurrent).
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Under the functional composition, we examine three components of expenditure – public
expenditure on health, public expenditure on education, and defense expenditures. We
choose these three spending categories mainly due to data availability.
Under economic classification of expenditure, we examine the determinants of
capital expenditure with particular interest on indicators of quality of governance. All
spending components are expressed as shares of total government expenditure. Below are
the testable hypotheses that derive from the discussion in the theoretical Chapter.

The hypotheses
1. Countries that have lower quality of governance or have less political freedom are
expected to spend relatively more on defense. This is because dictatorships that
perpetuate repressive regimes (with lower political freedom) have to rely on a
relatively strong military to stay in power. A strong military comes at the expense of
services to ordinary citizens such as education and health. This is partly because
citizens do not determine the leadership of the country, and thus cannot express their
preferences through a free and fair vote. Of course this hypothesis assumes away the
rare cases of benevolent dictators. Most dictatorships are challenged, and this
provides incentives to the dictatorship to have a strong army to guard against any
potential threats to their power. We think that benevolent dictatorships will only exist
where there are no immediate threats to the dictator’s power.
2. Poor quality institutions and the lack of political rights and civil liberties lead to
relatively lower public spending on health and education.
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3. Further, weak and underdeveloped institutions will likely lead to relatively more
capital spending and vice versa. For example, spending on big capital projects
enhances opportunities for rent-extraction in form of hefty bribes and other forms of
corruption.

Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology

Most research on the determinants of public expenditure has focused mainly on
total expenditure (Dudley and Montmarquette 1992; Fan and Rao 2003; Preston and
Ridge 1995; Singh and Sahni 1984) and on individual components of expenditure (Fan
and Rao 2003; Snyder and Yackovlev 2000; Sturm 2001). However, some studies have
empirically examined the functional composition of government spending using systems
of equations (Sanz and Velázquez 2002; Yildirim and Sezgin 2002), and single equation
models (Arze Del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab 2005).
In this dissertation we follow Sanz and Valazquez (2002); and Yildirim and
Sezgin (2002) to examine the determinants of the functional composition of expenditure.
Both papers use the Zellner (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach to
estimate the determinants of the various categories of public expenditure. In addition,
following Sturm (2001), we employ panel data methods to explore the determinants of
public capital expenditure.
Our work improves on the empirics of these previous studies by taking into
account the fractional nature of expenditure shares. We do this by employing nonlinear
estimation methods designed for estimations involving fractional response variables
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996).
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In addition to improvements in estimation procedures, we explicitly control for
institutional factors. As noted in the literature review, previous studies such as Sanz and
Valazquez (2002) use country dummies to control for differences in institutional quality.
Sturm (2001) uses such variables as the number of political assassinations and military
coups to control for political factors. We think that these measures do not effectively
capture the quality of governance since most countries experience very few coups or
political assassinations if any at all. The result of this is that we will observe zero coups
or political assassinations for most countries, which does not necessarily mean good
governance or presence of political freedom and civil liberties. Further, following Mauro
(1998), we examine both the functional composition of expenditures and composition by
economic type (capital versus current expenditures).

The seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach

Budgetary decisions to allocate spending to various spending categories are made
simultaneously. That is, when deciding how much to allocate to a particular category,
voters or the budgetary authority has to take into account their preferences regarding the
other categories (Sanz and Velázquez 2002). Besides, there could be random shocks that
affect all categories of spending contemporaneously. The SUR approach allows an
efficient estimation of a system of equations with contemporaneous cross-equation error
correlation. This approach, introduced by Zellner (1962), was extended to error
components models by Avery (1977) and Baltagi (1995)31.

31

A description of the model set up is given in Appendix C
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Fractional response variables32
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables in the SUR model are proportions
of total public expenditure allotted to various expenditure functions (health, education
and defense). This implies that 0 ≤ y j ≤ 1 for j = 1,...,3 . The fractional dependent
variable makes linear estimation procedures inappropriate for a couple of reasons.
First, as Papke and Wooldridge (1996) explain, “with a bounded dependent variable, the
effect of any explanatory variable, x , on the dependent variable cannot be constant over
the entire range of x unless the range of x is very limited.” Second, the predicted values
of y are not guaranteed to be between zero and one.
The most common way to deal with these problems is to perform a logistic (or
log-odds ratio) transformation. If we assume that the model that describes y is given by:
y=

1
, then a log-odds ratio transformation yields the following result33
1 + exp(− Xβ )

E (ln[ y (1 − y ) / X ]) = Xβ

(4.17)

The dependent variable in equation (4.17) mapped to the real line and can be estimated
using linear methods such as OLS.
However, this transformation poses a number of complications. First, extreme
values of 0 and 1 would have to be adjusted before the transformation, otherwise one
ends up with missing observations for these values because equation (4.17) is not defined
for these extreme values. Further, it is difficult or even impossible to make a logical
interpretation of the parameter estimates from the linear regression in (4.17). It is difficult
to recover E ( y / x) , which is the main interest in the analysis. With simple algebraic
32
33

This sub-section is based on work by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1990).
See Appendix D
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manipulations, we are able to obtain an expression for change in y resulting from small
changes in any of the explanatory variables as follows.34
∆y ˆ
= β [ y (1 − y )]
∆x

(4.18)

Where y is the dependent variable and βˆ are parameter estimates from equation
(4.17). To compute the partial effects from equation 4.18, we use the mean values of

y are the mean values of the dependent variables. However, we should note that the
expression in equation (4.18) is very limiting as it evaluates the partial effects only at the
selected values of the dependent variables.
To circumvent the problems with the log-odds transformation approach, Papke
and Wooldridge (1996) suggest an estimation procedure that models E ( y / x) directly as a
logistic function given by:
E ( y / X ) = G ( Xβ ) =

exp( Xβ )
[1 + exp( Xβ )]

(4.19)

Where G (•) is a function such that 0 < G < 1 for all real numbers. This ensures that the
predicted values of the dependent variable lie within the expected interval of [0, 1].
The approach to estimate β as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) is the quasimaximum likelihood estimation in a generalized linear models (GLM) framework, where
the quasi likelihood function is the binary choice log likelihood given below.35

l ( β ) ≡ y ln[G ( Xβ )] + (1 − y ) ln[1 − G ( Xβ )]

(4.20)

And G (•) is the logistic function in equation (4.15). The QML estimator of β is given
by:
N

max ∑ l i ( β ) ,
β

i =1

The marginal effect of any given explanatory variable x on the dependent
variable y is derived from equation (4.19) as follows:
34
35

See Appendix D and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1990)
Also see Wooldridge (2002); pp 661-663.

(4.21)
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∂E ( y / X ) ∂G ( Xβ ) ^
=
×β
∂x
∂ ( Xβ )

Where

(4.22)

^
∂G ( Xβ )
exp( Xβ )
and
β
is a vector of quasi-maximum likelihood
=
∂ ( Xβ )
[1 + exp( Xβ )]2

estimates obtained from equation (4.21).
The empirical model

In this sub-section, we describe the specific empirical model used to analyze the
effect of quality of governance and/or institutions on the functional and economic (capital
versus current expenditure) composition of expenditure.
For the functional composition, we estimate the following set of three equations.
HEALTH it1 = β 01 + β11GOVit + β 21 X 1 + u it1
EDUCit 2 = β 02 + β 12 GOVit + β 22 X 2 + u it 2

(4.23)

DEFENSEit 3 = β 03 + β 13 GOVit + β 23 X 3 + u it 3
In all the equations, “GOV” is an indicator of governance or quality of institutions. The
matrix, X 1 , consists of control variables for the health expenditure equation. Such
variables include per capita GDP, the government budget balance, population growth and
age structure, the rate of urbanization, and time dummies.
Sanz and Velázquez (2002) reports that higher per capita income has been
associated with increased spending in most expenditure functions. However, the effect of
per capita income on shares of different expenditures in total spending is not immediately
obvious. It is possible that higher per capita income leads to more spending on health
relative to defense.
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We also control for population growth since we expect that a rapidly growing
population will necessitate increased spending on health care. So we expect a positive
correlation between population growth and the share of health spending. We also include
population age structure. An older population is expected to increase demand for health
care. Therefore the percentage of total population that is over 65 years is expected to be
associated with relatively more public spending on health (Blomqvist and Carter 1997;
Sanz and Velázquez 2002).
The budget balance is included to capture the effect of macroeconomic
instabilities on health spending relative to other expenditure functions. We make no
priors regarding the expected effect of the budget balance on health share of spending.
The matrix, X2, contains control variables in the education expenditure equation,
and consists of GDP per capital, the government’s budget balance, population growth rate
and age structure, and time dummies. Most of these variables are similar to control
variables in the health expenditure equation, and they are used to control for similar
effects. However, the age structure variable is different. We believe that the age group
that will likely impact education expenditures is the younger group. Therefore, we expect
the share of education in total spending to be positively associated with the percentage of
the population in the school-going age group.
The matrix, X3, consists of control variables in the defense spending equation, and
consists of per capita GDP, the government’s budget balance, the rate of urbanization,
population growth rate and age structure, and population density. For the population age
structure in the defense spending equation, we include the percentage of the total
population between the ages of 18 and 64 years. As mentioned earlier, it is suggested in
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the literature that most illegal actions are committed by individuals or groups of
individuals between the ages of 18 and 25. So, we expect a positive partial correlation
between the percentage of young adults in the total population and defense spending
(Sanz and Velázquez 2002).
To estimate the equations in (4.23), we first perform a logistic transformation on
each of the three dependent variables and then estimate the system using the Zellner
(1962) seemingly unrelated approach. That is, using equation (4.17) the system of
equations in (4.23) becomes:
ln[ HEALTH i ,t1 /(1 − HEALTH i ,t1 )] = β 01 + β 11GOVi ,t + β 21 X 1 + u i ,t1
ln[ EDUCi ,t 2 /(1 − EDUCi ,t 2 )] = β 02 + β 12 GOVi ,t + β 22 X 2 + u i ,t 2

(4.24)

ln[ DEFENSEi ,t 3 /(1 − DEFECNSEi ,t 3 )] = β 03 + β 13 GOVi ,t + β 23 X 3 + u i ,t 3
We also estimate individual equations in (4.23) using the QML methods suggested by
Papke and Wooldridge (1996). That is
HEALTH i ,t1 = G ( β 01 + β 11GOVi ,t + β 21 X 1 + u i ,t1 )

(4.25)

EDUCi ,t 2 = G ( β 02 + β 12 GOVi ,t + β 22 X 2 + u i ,t 2 )

(4.26)

DEFENSEi ,t 3 = G ( β 03 + β 13GOVi ,t + β 23 X 3 + u i ,t 3 )

(4.27)

We analyze the effects of quality of governance and or institutions on capital
expenditure using the two methods described above – the log-odds transformation
approach and the quasi-maximum likelihood methods.
The equation we estimate is given below.
CAPITALit = α 0 + α 1GOVit + α 2 X 4 + u it

(4.28)
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Where CAPITAL is public capital expenditure as a share of total government expenditure
and X4 is a matrix of control variables such as per capita GDP, growth in private
investment, the government budget balance, population density, population growth,
regional dummies, and time dummies.
Note that the capital expenditure model is separate from the SUR model used for
the other public expenditure components – health, education, and defense. The reason for
this is that capital spending is based on a different classification (classification by
economic type) as described in the next section of this Chapter.
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Data Description and Sources

Our empirical estimation employs an unbalanced panel data set of 90-100
countries36 covering the period 1971– 2000. Details on data categories and sources are
provided in the following sub-sections.37

Public Expenditure Data

Data on public expenditure by function and economic type are obtained from the
IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS). The IMF functional categories include
general government services, public order and safety, defense, education, health, social
security & welfare, housing & communication amenities, recreation, cultural & religious
affairs, fuel and energy, transportation, etc. Due to lack of sufficient data, we use only
three of the functional categories – education, health and defense expenditures.
Classification by economic type of the expenditure consists of current expenditure
(expenditure on goods and services, wages and salaries, etc…) and capital expenditure
(acquisition of fixed capital assets, land and intangible assets).

Governance Data

Governance data used in this paper are from two different sources. The first source of
governance data is the “Freedom in the World Country Scores” compiled by Freedom
House. The data includes scores for political rights and civil liberties. The two scores are

36
37

The number of countries is smaller in the PRS (ICRG) data set.
See also Appendix E for a summary of data description and sources.
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measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom
and seven the lowest degree of freedom.
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, which
includes the right to vote and compete for public office and to elect representatives who
have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedom to develop
opinions, institutions and personal autonomy without interference from the state.38
Information used in the compilation of the scores is gathered from a broad range of
sources including news reports, nongovernmental organizations’ publications, think tank
and academic analyses, etc.
The second source of governance data is the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. The PRS group is a
commercial service that provides financial, economic and political risk assessment for
investors. The data used in this paper are from the academic version of the ICRG.39 The
data consists of indicators of the risk of repudiation of contracts by government, risk of
expropriation of private investment, corruption in government, rule of law, quality of
bureaucracy, and ethnic tensions. Data are for the period 1982-1997 covering about 90
developed and developing countries.
The risk of contract repudiation and the risk of expropriation of private property
are used in this analysis as proxies for contract enforcement, and protection of property
rights respectively. We postulate that poor contract enforcement is an indication of
institutional instability. The extent of government corruption and the index of the rule of

38

See http://www.freedomhouse.org/reseach/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm for details and
methodology. The data were also obtained from this Freedom House website.
39
Source: Mina (2002).
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law capture the extent to which citizens respect the rules that govern social and economic
interaction. The quality of the bureaucracy captures institutional efficiency.
The risk of contract repudiation and the risk of expropriation are measured on a
scale of 0-10, with a higher score indicating a lower risk. Government corruption, rule of
law and the quality of the bureaucracy are measured on a scale of 0-6, with a higher score
indicating better performance.

Other Explanatory Variables

Other economic and demographic variables used as control variables are obtained
from the 2003 World Development Indicators CD-ROM. These variables include real
GDP per capita, real GDP per capita growth rate, domestic investment, government
consumption, and supplemental data on public expenditure such as health, and education.
Also included here is data on government capital expenditure as a percentage of total
government spending to supplement the GFS data. Data on schooling are obtained from
the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset on education attainment across countries.40

40

Data were obtained from http://www.cid.havard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.

CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this Chapter, we report results of the empirical analysis conducted to
investigate the direct and indirect growth effects of governance. The first section of the
Chapter will discuss the empirical findings regarding the direct effect of quality of
governance on growth. Under this section, we also report and discuss the empirical
results for the Sub-Saharan Africa sub-sample. In the second part of the Chapter, we
report and discuss empirical findings regarding the effects of quality of governance on
allocation of public expenditure.

Quality of Governance and Growth in per Capita GDP

Although we report results from three estimation procedures41, the detailed
discussion of the results is based on the system GMM estimates. This is because we
believe that the system GMM estimator effectively deals with the endogeneity problem,
and thus gives consistent estimates. A brief discussion of the random and fixed effects
estimates will me made as a way of comparing the results from the three estimators.

41

We report System GMM, fixed effects and random effects results.
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The System GMM (Dynamic Panel Model) Estimates

As pointed out in the preceding Chapter, in the presence of a persistent dependent
variable and endogenous regressors, both the random effects and the fixed effects
estimators are inconsistent. We therefore use a GMM dynamic panel data model to deal
with this problem.
In Table 1, we present results obtained from a two-step system GMM dynamic
panel estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991) and extended by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All the indicators of quality of governance
have the expected sign and five of the six indicators are statistically significant. The
indicator of political freedoms (labeled ‘freedom’) has a negative coefficient, but is
statistically insignificant. This indicator is measured on a scale of 1 through 7 and a
higher value of the index indicates lower political freedom. Therefore, a negative
coefficient implies a negative impact of lower political freedoms on growth.
The rule of law index has the expected positive sign, implying that better
maintenance of the rule of law is growth-enhancing. Specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in the index of rule of law is associated with a 0.79 (1.63 x 0.485)
percentage point increase in the rate of growth in real per capita GDP, all else constant.
The index of corruption also has the expected positive sign. A one standard
deviation increase in the index of corruption is associated with a 0.91 (1.48 x 0.617)
percentage point increase in the rate of growth in per capita GDP, all else constant.
An indicator of the quality of the bureaucracy shows a positive and statistically
significant coefficient, implying that a better quality bureaucracy is good for growth.
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the index of bureaucratic quality is
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associated with a 0.34 (1.62 x 0.211) percentage point increase in the rate of growth in
GDP per capita, all else equal.

Table 1. Dynamic Panel Estimates. The Dependent Variable is the Growth rate in Real
per Capita GDP.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Initial GDP

-0.819
(0.508)

-0.348
(0.165)*

-0.442
(0.182)*

0.007
(0.231)

-1.137
(0.203)**

-0.524
(0.201)**

Govt. cons

-0.010
(0.037)

-0.054
(0.019)**

-0.058
(0.019)**

-0.031
(0.021)

-0.007
(0.017)

-0.032
(0.016)*

Investment

0.124
(0.041)**

0.233
(0.015)**

0.256
(0.016)**

0.241
(0.014)**

0.192
(0.014)**

0.224
(0.014)**

Export growth

0.199
(0.033)**

0.137
(0.010)**

0.127
(0.008)**

0.138
(0.010)**

0.151
(0.010)**

0.131
(0.010)**

Schooling

0.671
(0.263)*

0.121
(0.093)

0.191
(0.110)+

0.036
(0.127)

0.254
(0.125)*

0.180
(0.134)

Freedom

-0.228
(0.197)

Rule of law

0.485
(0.098)**

Corruption

0.617
(0.135)**

Exprop. Risk

0.546
(0.087)**

Repud. Risk

0.951
(0.107)**

Bureau Qual.
Observations
Countries
Hansen Test
AR(1)
AR(2)

0.211
(0.126)+
540
100
0.656
0.00
0.484

345
90
0.277
0.00
0.636

345
90
0.297
0.00
0.305

345
90
0.249
0.00
0.449

345
90
0.286
0.00
0.582

345
90
0.180
0.00
0.402

Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported results of the Hansen test, AR(1), and AR(2) are
P-values.
+ Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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The indexes of risk of repudiation of government contracts and the risk of
expropriation of private property both have statistically significant effects on growth in
real per capita GDP. A one standard deviation increase in the index of repudiation of
contracts (lower risk) is associated with a 2.1 (2.18 x 0.951) percentage points increase in
the rate of growth in real per capita GDP, all else constant. Likewise, a one standard
deviation increase in the index of risk of expropriation of private property (lower risk) is
associated with a 1.2 (2.2 x 0.546) percentage points increase in the rate of growth in real
per capita GDP, all else constant.
In addition to proxies of governance, we include a number of control variables.
The control variables included are those that have been found to significantly impact
growth by previous researchers. We include initial GDP per capita based on the
convergence hypothesis. Countries with a lower initial per capita GDP relative to the
target (steady-state) level of per capita GDP will tend to grow faster and vice versa. This
tendency is attributed to diminishing marginal productivity of capital.
The data used to estimate the growth equation are averaged over five-year periods
from 1971 through 2000 to avoid modeling short-term cyclical fluctuations. Thus, the 30year long panel reduces to a 6-period long panel. From this shorter panel we construct a
variable (which we call Initial GDP per Capita) by taking the GDP per capita for the first
year in every 5-year average. For example, for any country, j, the “Initial GDP per
capita” corresponding to the 1971-1975 average is country j’s GDP per capita for 1971.
For most of the specifications reported in Table 1, “Initial GDP per Capita” has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient, which supports the convergence
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hypothesis. That is, the higher the starting GDP per Capita, the lower the growth rate in
real per capita GDP. This result repeats findings of most studies in the growth literature.
To evaluate the convergence hypothesis, we control for differences in the target
levels of GDP per capita across countries. The controls included in the model are private
investment ratio, government final consumption ratio, export growth, and education
attainment.
Private investment is measured as a percentage of GDP. Our results show a
positive and significant impact of private investment on growth in per capita GDP. The
ratio of investment to GDP increases the target (steady-state) level of output per effective
worker, and thus for a given starting level of per capita GDP, the growth rate will be
higher (Barro 1997). For the different specifications reported in Table 1, a one standard
deviation increase in the investment ratio is expected to increase the growth rate by 0.85
(0.124x6.86) to 1.76 (0.256x6.86) percentage points.
Government final consumption is also expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Government final consumption enters the regression as a measure of government’s
nonproductive spending, but also controls for government size. We get a negative
coefficient and statistically significant in three of the six specifications in Table 1. These
results suggest that a smaller government is good for growth, all else constant. A one
standard deviation increase in the government final consumption ratio is associated with a
decline in the rate of growth in per capita GDP of about 0.19 (-0.032x5.86) to 0.34 (0.058x5.86).
We include the growth rate of exports as a measure of openness. The coefficient
on the growth of exports has the expected positive sign. It is statistically significant and
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robust to specification changes. Table 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase in
the growth rate of exports is associated with a 0.97 (0.131x7.41) to 1.47 (0.199x7.41)
increase in real per capita GDP growth rate, all other things constant.
It is important to note that various studies have used trade (sum of exports and
imports) as a percentage of GDP as a measure of openness. However, following GyimahBrempong (2002), we use the growth rate of exports. We think that developing countries
that export a few low-priced primary products and import high-priced finished products
may grow slower than countries importing raw materials and exporting finished products
even though the total volume of trade may be the same. In short, we think that the
composition of trade may matter for growth in some cases. Barro (1997) controls for the
degree of openness using changes in terms of trade, defined as a ratio of export to import
prices, and reports a positive and statistically significant effect on growth in per capita
GDP.
Lastly, we control for differences in the quality of human capital using the
average years of school for the population 15 years or older. As expected, Table 1 reports
a positive coefficient on the schooling variable and is significant in half of the
specifications reported. More and better quality human capital increases the steady-state
output per effective worker and therefore increase growth rates in per capita GDP for a
given starting value of output per effective worker. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in the average years of schooling is associated with a 0.53 (0.191x2.8) to 1.88
(0.671x2.8) percentage points increase in real per capita GDP growth.
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As mentioned above, we run the same specifications in Table 1 using the random
effects and the fixed effects estimators. Table 2 reports the fixed effects estimates while
Table 3 reports the random effects estimates.

Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates. The Dependent Variable is Growth rate in Real per
Capita GDP.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Initial GDP

-0.291
(0.051)**

-0.449
(0.079)**

-0.436
(0.08)**

-0.426
(0.08)**

Govt. cons

-0.071
(0.035)*

-0.012
(0.046)

-0.024
(0.047)

-0.025
(0.047)

Investment

0.158
(0.022)**

0.210
(0.034)**

0.221
(0.034)**

0.223
(0.034)**

0.194
0.199
(0.033)** (0.034)**

Export growth

0.107
(0.015)**

0.109
(0.020)**

0.108
(0.020)**

0.108
(0.020)**

0.114
0.110
(0.019)** (0.020)**

Schooling

0.357
(0.233)

0.588
(0.390)

0.705
(0.391)+

0.689
(0.387)+

Freedom

0.062
(0.121)

Rule of Law
Corruption

(5)

-0.473
-0.405
(0.076)** (0.079)**
-0.017
(0.044)

0.162
(0.381)

-0.008
(0.046)

0.325
(0.401)

0.316
(0.191)+
-0.086
(0.210)

Exprop. Risk

0.353
(0.124)**

Repud. Risk
Bureau Qual.

(6)

0.659
(0.127)**
-0.165
(0.260)

Observations
540
345
345
345
Countries
100
90
90
90
R-squared
0.35
0.38
0.38
0.38
Standard errors are in parentheses.
+ Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

345
90
0.44

345
90
0.39
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Table 3. Random Effects Estimates. The dependent Variable is growth rate of real
per capita GDP
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Initial GDP

-0.450
(0.155)**

-0.538
(0.202)**

-0.425
(0.198)*

-0.488
(0.206)*

-0.713
(0.188)**

-0.492
(0.179)**

Gov. cons.

-0.041
(0.021)+

-0.035
(0.027)

-0.043
(0.028)

-0.038
(0.027)

-0.037
(0.025)

-0.037
(0.025)

Investment

0.149
(0.017)**

0.171
(0.023)**

0.177
0.176
(0.023)** (0.023)**

0.153
(0.022)**

0.154
(0.022)**

Export growth

0.146
(0.014)**

0.138
(0.020)**

0.138
0.138
(0.020)** (0.020)**

0.142
(0.019)**

0.144
(0.019)**

Schooling

0.277
(0.085)**

0.316
(0.110)**

0.311
0.317
(0.111)** (0.109)**

0.218
(0.104)*

0.224
(0.104)*

Freedom

-0.258
(0.087)**

Rule of law

0.444
(0.133)**

corruption

0.342
(0.141)*

Exprop. Risk

0.555
(0.096)**

Repud. Risk

0.687
(0.102)**

Bureau. Qual.

Observations
Number of
countries.

0.356
(0.143)*
540
100

345
90

345
90

345
90

345
90

345
90

Standard errors are in parentheses; + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A noticeable difference in the results is with the fixed effects estimates. Only
three of the six indicators of governance – the rule of law index, the index of risk of
repudiation of contacts, and the index of the risk of government expropriation of private
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property- have the expected signs and are statistically significant. The other three
indicators are statistically insignificant and have the wrong signs. What explains the
difference in results between the system GMM estimates and the fixed effects estimates
is not clear, but we suspect that since some of the indicators of governance have a limited
within-country variation, the fixed effects transformation may be causing the unexpected
results in Table 2.
The random effects estimates, on the other hand, are very similar to the system
GMM estimates. All the indicators of governance have the expected signs and are
statistically significant. The magnitudes of the estimates are also comparable with the
system GMM estimates.

The Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-sample

Table 4 reports regression estimates for the Sub-Saharan Africa sub-sample. Due
to insufficient data on most indicators of quality of governance, we use only the index of
freedom to capture the effect of quality of governance in this sub-sample analysis. The
results indicate a bigger magnitude of the adverse effects of poor governance compared
to the full sample estimates.
Specifically, based on the system GMM estimate in Table 4, a one standard
deviation increase in the index of freedom (decline in political rights and civil liberties) is
associated with a 0.97 (-0.704x1.378)42 percentage points decline in the rate of growth in

42

This estimate is based on the standard deviation of “Freedom” for the Sub-Saharan Africa sub-sample.
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per capita GDP. This contrasts with a decline of about 0.44 (-0.228x1.92)43 percentage
point for a one-standard deviation increase in the index of freedom for the full sample.

Table 4. Regression estimates for the Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Sample. The Dependent
Variable is Growth in real per capital GDP.
Fixed Effects (2)

Random Effects (3)

Dynamic Panel (4)

Initial GDP
Per Capita

-0.413
(0.110)**

-0.824
(0.446)+

-0.306
(0.147)*

Gov’t
Consumption

-0.092
(0.064)

-0.095
(0.051)+

0.041
(0.055)

Investment

0.147
(0.038)**

0.137
(0.032)**

0.024
(0.037)

Export Growth

0.108
(0.025)**

0.119
(0.024)**

0.183
(0.025)**

Years of
Schooling

0.568
(0.478)

0.488
(0.239)*

1.368
(0.613)*

Index of
Freedom

-0.494
(0.221)*

-0.785
(0.182)**

-0.704
(0.220)**

Observations
R-squared
Countries

148
0.46
29

148

148

29

29

Robust standard errors in parentheses
at 1%

; + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant

Thus, the simple conclusion from the result is that the cost of poor governance as
indicated by low levels of civil liberties and political rights is higher in Sub-Saharan
Africa relative to the other regions of the world. Coefficient estimates on the control

43

Although the “freedom” coefficient (Table 1) is statistically insignificant in the full sample, it compares
in magnitude with the random effects estimate in Table 3.
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variables are similar to the full sample estimates except for some relatively minor
differences in magnitudes.

Direct versus Indirect Growth Effects of Governance

As discussed in the preceding Chapter, we attempt to separate the total growth
effect of governance into the direct effect and the indirect effect. The indirect effect is
one channeled through the composition of government expenditures, while the “direct”
effect is channeled through other mechanisms such as investment, productivity, etc.
Table 5 presents an instrumental variables approach estimates of the growth
equation with shares of expenditures on education, health, and defense as additional
right-hand-side variables. In specification (4) of Table 5, after controlling for all the three
expenditures shares, the indicator of governance is statistically insignificant. However,
we notice that the magnitude of the estimate is quite substantial, but with an equally
substantially big standard error. This causes us to suspect the presence of
multicollinearity as a possible cause of inflated standard errors.
Nonetheless, we compute the total growth effect of governance as described in
equation (4.15). Table 5 presents second-stage instrumental variables approach estimates,
while Table 6 reports the first-stage results. Based on these results and equation (4.15),
the net effect of governance on growth in per capita income is -0.671+ [(-0.244 x -0.397)
+ (-0.148 x -0.33)+(0.167 x 1.772)] = -0.229. This implies that a one point increase in the
indicator of political freedoms (meaning declining freedoms), is associated with a 0.23
percentage point decline in the growth of real per capita GDP. The magnitude of the
coefficient turns out to be very close to the coefficient on “freedom” in Tables 1 and 3,
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where expenditure shares are excluded from the regressions, which should be the
expected result.

Table 5. Instrumental Variables Results: The Dependent Variable is Growth in Real per
Capita GDP
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Initial GDP

-0.313
(0.133)*

-0.331
(0.170)+

-0.433
(0.162)**

-0.605
(0.275)*

Govt. consumption

-0.037
(0.028)

-0.038
(0.030)

-0.044
(0.030)

-0.026
(0.031)

Investment

0.160
(0.029)**

0.143
(0.030)**

0.154
(0.031)**

0.142
(0.032)**

Export Growth

0.243
(0.026)**

0.241
(0.026)**

0.240
(0.029)**

0.238
(0.028)**

Schooling

0.209
(0.101)*

0.248
(0.096)*

0.206
(0.101)*

0.144
(0.105)

Freedom

-0.183
(0.106)+

-0.359
(0.093)**

-0.677
(0.371)+

-0.671
(0.642)

Share of Education

-0.116
(0.048)*

Share of Health

-0.244
(0.069)**
-0.051
(0.101)

Share of Defense
Observations

312

311

-0.148
(0.137)
0.154
(0.188)

0.167
(0.287)

294

293

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at
1%
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Table 6. IV First Stage Estimates

Dependent Variable
Share of Educ.
Expenditure

Share of Health
Expenditure

Share of Defense
Expenditure

Freedom

-0.397
(0.210)+

-0.330
(0.182)+

1.772
(0.186)**

Percent Pop 0-14 years

0.410
(0.022)**

Percent Pop 65+ years

0.632
(0.045)**

Fertility Rate

1.039
(0.173)**

Percent Pop 15-64 years
Observations
R-squared

0.077
(0.010)**
392
0.86

391
0.68

365
0.70

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at
1%

Ironically, this result suggests that the indirect channel through the composition of
public expenditures actually reduces the adverse effect of poor governance on economic
growth. Whereas the direct effect (Model 4 in Table 5) is -0.671, the net adverse effect of
poor quality governance is -0.229 due to the positive indirect effect of 0.442.
In Table 7 we present system GMM estimates for the growth equation while
controlling for expenditure composition. Based on the estimates in model 5 of Table 7
and first-stage results in Table 6, the net effect of governance on the rate of growth in real
per capita GDP (also computed from equation 4.15) is -0.403, implying a positive
indirect effect 0.22 of a percentage point. This suggests that a one point increase in the
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index of freedom (declining freedom) is associated with a 0.4 percentage point decline in
growth.

Table 7. Two-Step System GMM Estimates: The Dependent Variable is Growth in Real
Per Capita GDP.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Initial GDP

-0.793
(0.397)*

-0.840
(0.401)*

-1.220
(0.288)**

0.305
(0.274)

-0.664
(0.220)**

Govt. Con.

-0.093
(0.033)**

-0.057
(0.029)+

-0.153
(0.040)**

-0.137
(0.033)**

-0.087
(0.019)**

Invest

0.076
(0.033)*

0.056
(0.029)+

0.075
(0.039)+

0.111
(0.023)**

0.139
(0.016)**

Export growth

0.399
(0.051)**

0.385
(0.053)**

0.327
(0.053)**

0.261
(0.037)**

0.294
(0.030)**

Schooling

0.696
(0.215)**

0.610
(0.163)**

0.494
(0.148)**

0.302
(0.176)+

0.436
(0.110)**

Freedom

-0.411
(0.140)**

-0.493
(0.204)*

-0.862
(0.206)**

-0.287
(0.137)*

-0.650
(0.112)**

Share of Education

-0.031
(0.042)

Share of Health

-0.039
(0.020)+
-0.046
(0.022)*

Share of Defense

-0.117
(0.023)**
0.111
(0.049)*

Share of Capital
Observations
Countries
Hansen Test
AR(1)
AR(2)

0.109
(0.022)**
0.006
(0.024)

312
69
0.567
0.00
0.505

311
68
0.589
0.00
0.356

294
66
0.088
0.00
0.282

358
73
0.543
0.00
0.873

293
66
0.397
0.00
0.714

Standard errors in parentheses; + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Quality of Governance and Composition of Public Expenditure

In this section of the Chapter, we report and discuss the results of our analysis of
the quality of governance and the composition of public expenditure. We begin our
discussions with the functional allocation of expenditure and later we discuss causal
effects of governance on capital expenditure.

Functional Composition of Expenditure

Our analysis of the functional allocation of public spending is based on three
major functional public spending categories – health, education, and defense. As
discussed in Chapter IV, we estimate the effect of governance on the functional
composition of expenditures using two estimators. The first is the Zellner (1962)
seemingly unrelated procedure, and the second is the quasi maximum likelihood
estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
These procedures are chosen to deal with two separate econometric issues. The
obvious one is that the dependent variables in equations (4.23) are shares of total public
spending and therefore bounded between zero and one. The send issue, also discussed in
Chapter IV, is that the error processes in equations (4.23) might be correlated across
equations.
In Table 8, we present estimates from a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
model. It is important to note that the SUR model only deals with the second of the two
empirical issues stated above – the cross equation correlation in error processes.
Nonetheless, the results in Table 8 provide a good idea of the direction (and perhaps the
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magnitudes) of the effects of governance on the composition of expenditures. For that
reason, we provide a brief discussion of these estimates.

Table 8. SUR Estimates for Expenditure Composition.
Dependent Variable
Health Expend.
Share
-0.008
(0.004)*

Education
Expend. Share
-0.006
(0.0035)+

Defense
Expend. Share
-0.028
(0.005)**

Budget Balance

0.0004
(0.0001)**

0.001
(0.0001)**

-0.001
(0.0002)**

Urbanization

0.000
(0.000)

GDP per Capita

-0.002
(0.0003)**

Density

0.000
(0.000)**

Pop. Under 15
years

0.001
(0.0004)*

Pop. 15-64 years

-0.0002
(0.0006)

Pop. Over 65
years

-0.001
(0.001)

Pop. Growth rate

0.0001
(0.0014)

-0.007
(0.002)**

0.007
(0.0019)**

Index of freedom

-0.003
(0.001)**

-0.003
(0.001)**

0.005
(0.0012)**

N

1402

1402

1402

+ Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parenthesis.

The SUR estimates suggests that lower political freedoms are associated with
smaller shares of spending on education and health and higher shares of public spending
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devoted to defense. This is agrees with the rent-seeking and rent extraction hypothesis
discussed earlier. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the indicator of
political freedoms (declining freedom) is associated with a 0.56 (-0.003 x 100 x 1.86)
percentage point decline the share of education spending in total expenditures and a 0.3 (0.003 x 100 x 1.86) percentage point decline in the share of health expenditure in total
public spending. On the other hand, a one point increase in the indicator of political
freedom is associated with a 0.93 (0.005 x 100 x 1.86) percentage point increase in the
share of defense expenditure in total spending.
Table 9 presents estimation results of the seemingly unrelated (SUR) model with
a log-odds transformation of the dependent variables as shown in equations (4.24). As
discussed in Chapter IV, we transform the dependent variables to deal with the fractional
nature of the dependent variable. For each of the equations, Table 9 reports the
coefficient estimates and the “marginal effects” computed from equation (4.18).
We find that political rights and civil liberties positively impact health expenditure as a
share of total public expenditure and education expenditure as a share of total public
expenditure. However, political freedom has a negative impact on defense spending as a
share of total public expenditure. This confirms the results in Table 8.
A one standard deviation increase in the index of political freedom (implying a
decline in freedom) is associated with a 0.56 (1.86 x 100 x 0.003) percentage point
decline in health expenditure as a share of total public expenditure.44 A one standard
deviation increase in the index of political freedom is associated with a 0.37 (1.86 x 100 x
0.002) percentage point decline in public expenditure on education as a share of total

44

Marginal effects are computed at the mean values of the dependent variable.
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public expenditure. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in the index of
political freedom is associated with a 1.11 (1.86 x 100 x 0.006) percentage point increase
in defense spending as a share of total public spending.

Table 9. SUR Estimates for Expenditure Composition with the Log-odds transformation.
Dependent
Variable

Health
(1)
Coeff.
M/ Effect

Education
(2)
Coeff.
M/Effect

Defense
(3)
Coeff.
M/Effect

(∆y ∆x)

( ∆y ∆x )

(∆y ∆x)
GDP per Capita

-0.35
(0.067)**

-0.023

-0.158
(0.033)**

-0.017

-0.345
(0.052)**

-0.031

Budget Balance

0.01
(0.002)**

0.001

0.009
(0.001)**

0.001

-0.005
(0.002)*

-0.000

0.005
(0.004)

0.000

-0.021
(0.003)**

-0.002

0.000
(0.000)**

0.000

0.015
(0.006)**

0.001

Urbanization
Density
Pop. Under 15
years

0.012
(0.004)**

0.001

Pop. 15-64 years
Pop. Over 65
years

0.0363
(0.022)+

0.002

Pop. Growth rate

-0.029
(0.025)

-0.002

-0.049
(0.013)**

-0.005

0.067
(0.019)**

0.006

Index of freedom

-0.05
(0.016)**
1402

-0.003

-0.018
(0.008)*
1402

-0.002

0.061
(0.012)**
1402

0.006

N

Standard errors in parenthesis; ** denotes significance at 99 percent; * denotes significance at 95
percent; + denotes significance at 90 percent.

Our interpretation of these results is based on the hypotheses stated in Chapter IV.
Countries with lower political rights and civil liberties do not elect the leaders who make
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budgetary decisions, and therefore public spending will be structured to maximize the
leaders’ utility. In a dictatorial regime, defense spending is crucial to protect the leaders’
power. This might explain the relative increase in defense spending. This increase in
defense spending is taking away from health and education spending – two sectors that
are not as crucial to the political survival of those in power. In a more democratic society,
citizens indirectly choose the allocation of public resources through elections. To the
extent that health and education matter more relative to defense to a typical citizen, more
political freedoms will be associated with increased spending on health and education.
This is what the results in Table 9 show – a bigger share of the public budget
going to defense spending and a smaller share of the budget devoted to education and
health as the level of political freedoms decline. Keefer and Khemani (2003) discuss the
effect of incentives to politicians on the provision of social services. They conclude that
health and education services are most vulnerable to imperfections in the political market.
Keefer and Khemani (2003) argue that political market imperfections “help to explain a
well-known distortion in public spending: the preference for governments to spend on
targeted programs, such as government jobs or infrastructure investment, rather than on
improvements in broad social services.” As our results in Table 9 suggest, with a
complete lack of a political market, these distortions could be exacerbated.
We control for differences in income across countries using GDP per capita.
Notice from Table 9 that the marginal effects on this variable for all the three equations
are negative and statistically significant. The results indicate lower spending shares in
each of the categories as income increases. This result runs contrary to Sanz and
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Velasquez (2002) who, in a sample of OECD member countries, find positive and high
income elasticity in regard to health.
Results also suggest that relative spending on health and education is positively
impacted by the government budget balance (Revenues minus expenditure) as a
percentage of GDP. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the budget balance
is associated with a 0.58 (0.001 x 100 x 5.79) of a percentage point increase in relative
spending on both health and education. However, the results in Table 9 show a negative
impact of the budget balance on relative spending on defense. A one standard deviation
increase in the budget balance is associated with a decline in the share of defense
expenditures by 0.26 (0.00045 x 100 x 5.79) of a percentage point. The explanation for
this result is not clear, but it could be the case that defense spending is, at least in part,
financed by increasing central government deficits.
Population density has a positive causal impact on defense spending as a
percentage of total spending, a result similar to one obtained by Sanz and Velasquez
(2002). A one standard deviation increase in population density is associated with a 1.45
(2.1E-5 x 700.29 x 100) percentage points increase in the share of defense spending. Sanz
and Velasquez (2002) interpret this positive relationship to mean that “security increases
in importance in countries where population is concentrated.”
However, the percentage of the total population leaving in urban areas, which is
positively correlated with population density, is found to have a negative relationship
with the share of defense spending in total public spending. This may be due to the public
good nature of national defense. In other words, having a relatively big percentage of the
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population concentrated in urban centers may reduce spending by focusing resources in a
few urban areas other than spreading them through out the entire country.
Further, as suggested in previous studies, the age structure of the population
significantly affects the composition of public expenditure. The literature suggests that a
younger population is expected lead to a higher share of education expenditure in total
public spending. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of people below 15
years of age is associated with a 0.97 (0.001 x 100 x 9.65) of a percentage point increase
in the relative share of education expenditure.
The percentage of total population over the age of 65 years, as expected, is
associated with a relatively bigger share of health expenditure in total public expenditure.
A one standard deviation increase in the share of total population over 65 years of age is
associated with a 0.91 (0.002 x 100 x 4.57) percentage point increase in the relative share
of health expenditure.
Likewise, the share of total population between the ages of 15 and 64 years is
found to have a positive causal impact on defense spending. The share of defense
expenditure in total public expenditure goes up by about 0.59 (0.001 x 100 x 5.88) ) of a
percentage point as a result of a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the
total population between the ages of 15 and 64 years. One plausible explanation for this
relationship is that most illegal and rebellious activities that might threaten the security of
the State are likely to be carried out by individuals between 18 and 35 years of age
(Marlow and Shiers 1999).
Population growth rate has a negative impact on the share of education
expenditure, and a positive impact on the share of defense spending. A one standard

96
deviation increase in the population growth rate is associated with a 0.56 (-0.005 x 100 x
1.12) percentage point decline in the share of education expenditure and a 0.67 (0.006 x
100 x 1.12) of a percentage point increase in the share of defense spending. The impact of
population growth rate on the share of health expenditure is negative but statistically
insignificant. This result suggests that a rapidly increasing population demands more
spending on defense to guard against potential rebellious activities that may be associated
with a higher and increasing population. However, this spending comes at a cost in terms
of spending on education and possibly health. Put differently, defense spending crowdsout spending on education and health.
Results obtained from the Quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) methods suggested
by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) are, for the most part, similar to the SUR results
discussed above. The QML results for the functional composition of expenditures are
presented in Table 10. The index of political freedom has the expected negative
coefficient in the shares of health and education expenditures regressions, and a positive
coefficient in the share of defense spending equation. Specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in the index of freedom (declining political freedoms) is associated
with a 0.56 (-0.003 x 100 x 1.86) percentage point decline in the share of health
expenditures, a 0.74 (-0.004 x 100 x 1.86) percentage point decline in the share of
education expenditure and a 2.05 (0.011 x 100 x 1.86) percentage points increase in the
share of defense expenditures.
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Table 10. Quasi-maximum Likelihood (QML) Estimates for Expenditure Composition.
Dependent
Variable

Share of Health
(1)
Coeff.
M/ Effect

Share of Education
(2)
Coeff.
M/ Effect

GDP per
Capita

-0.067
(0.052)

-0.006

-0.022
(0.030)

-0.005

-0.313
(0.049)**

-0.076

Budget Balance

0.008
(0.002)**

0.001

0.01
(0.001)**

0.002

-0.009
(0.002)**

-0.002

Urbanization

0.006
(0.004)

0.001

0.003
(0.002)

0.001

-0.01
(0.003)**

-0.002

0.000
(0.000)**

0.000

0.001
(0.005)

0.000

Density
Pop. Under 15
years

0.006
(0.003)

Share of Defense
(3)
Coeff.
M/Effect

0.001

Pop. 15-64
years
Pop. Over 65
years

0.039
(0.019)*

0.003

Pop. Growth
rate

-0.017
(0.019)

-0.001

-0.049
(0.012)**

-0.012

0.066
(0.016)**

0.016

Index of
freedom

-0.038
(0.012)**

-0.003

-0.019
(0.007)**

-0.004

0.046
(0.011)**

0.011

N

1512

1542

1407

Standard errors in parenthesis; ** denotes significance at 99 percent; * denotes significance at 95
percent; + denotes significance at 90 percent.
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Public Capital Expenditure and Quality of Governance

In this subsection, we discuss results of our analysis of the effect of quality of
governance on the share of public capital expenditure. Table 11 presents quasi-maximum
likelihood estimates for the share of public capital expenditure.

Table 11. Quasi-maximum likelihood Estimates. The dependent variable is Capital
Expenditure as a Percentage of total Public Expenditures
(1)
Variable
Name

(2)

(3)

Coeff.

M/effect

Coeff.

M/Effect

Coeff.

M/Effect

-.063

-0.284**
(0.039)
0.039**
(0.003)

-0.071

-0.282**
(0.037)
0.038**
(0.003)

-0.070

Private
Investment

-0.272**
(0.025)
0.027**
(0.002)

Budget
Balance

0.018**
(0.002)

0.004

0.027**
(0.004)

0.007

0.025**
(0.004)

0.006

Rate of
Urbanization

-0.006**
(0.001)

-0.001

-0.006**
(0.001)

-0.001

-0.006**
(0.001)

-0.001

Population
Growth Rate

0.132**
(0.017)

0.031

0.165**
(0.024)

0.041

0.168**
(0.024)

0.042

Index of
Freedom

0.074**
(0.010)

0.017
-0.041+
(0.022)

-0.010
-0.046*
(0.02)

-0.011

GDP Per capita

Rule of law
Index

0.006

Index of
Corruption
N

1816

956

0.010

0.009

956

Standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes significance at 99 percent; ** denotes significance at
95 percent; * denotes significance at 90 percent.
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We use three indicators of governance – political freedom, maintenance of rule of
law, and perceptions of corruption – each in a separate regression. For each of the
regressions, Table 11 reports both the coefficient estimates and marginal effects
computed from equation (4.22).
We find a negative impact of political freedom on the share of public capital
expenditure. That is, lack of (or less) political freedom is associated with higher shares of
public capital expenditure in total public spending. Recalling that our index of freedom is
measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the lowest level of freedom, the positive
coefficient on the index of freedom should be interpreted as a negative impact of a higher
level of political freedom on the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in
the index of freedom (declining freedom) is associated with a 3.16 (0.017 x 100 x 1.86)
percentage points increase in the relative share of public capital expenditure in total
public spending.
This supports hypothesis (3) as stated in the previous Chapter and the theoretical
propositions discussed in Keefer and Khemani (2003). Countries under dictatorships are
characterized by lack of public scrutiny and an effective media that probes government
operations. In such cases, we expect political leaders to maximize their own private
economic rents by investing more public resources in big investment ventures that are
associated with big rents – commissions and or bribes – and no public utility.
In the second specification we include the rule of law index as an indicator of
quality of governance. The results of this specification are consistent with the first
specification. An improvement in the maintenance of the rule of law is associated with a
smaller share of public capital spending in total public spending. Specifically, a one
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standard deviation increase in the index of rule law (improvement in the maintenance of
rule of law) is associated with a 1.62 (-0.01 x 100 x 1.62) percentage points decline in the
share of public capital expenditure in total public expenditure.
We get consistent results when an index of corruption is used to measure the
quality of governance. A one point increase in the index of corruption (lower corruption)
is associated with a 1.63 (-0.011 x 100 x 1.48) percentage points decline in the share of
public capital expenditure in total public expenditure. Our results agree with Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997), who find that corruption significantly increases public investment
spending. However, in a study of 123 non-OECD countries, Sturm (2001) does not find
any evidence of a causal effect between political and institutional variables on public
capital expenditure.
We include GDP per capita as an explanatory variable to control for differences in
the level of development. Results indicate that low-income countries are associated with
relatively bigger shares of capital expenditure in total expenditure. We also find that
private investment stimulates public capital spending. A one standard deviation increase
in private investment as a share of GDP is associated with a 4.12 (0.006 x 100 x 6.86)) to
6.86 (0.01 x 100 x 6.86) percentage points increase in the share of public capital
expenditure in total expenditure. A plausible explanation for this result is that public
investment is complementary to private investment through the provision of
infrastructure necessary for profitable private investment.
Public capital spending is also positively impacted by the budget balance. A one
standard deviation increase in the budget balance as a percentage of GDP is associated
with a 2.3 (0.004 x 100 x 5.79) to 4.05 (0.007 x 100 x 5.79) percentage points increase in
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the share of capital expenditure in total public expenditure. When a government is
running a budget deficit, it is politically easier to cut capital spending as public
investment tends to be more discretionary spending compared to recurrent expenditures.
On the other hand, when the government budget is in a surplus, capital spending is
expected to increase relative to recurrent expenditure. For example, wages and salaries
form a big part of a typical recurrent budget. Since this part of the budget is, for the most
part, not adjusted every budget year, recurrent expenditures will respond less to budget
surpluses relative to public investment. This might explain the positive relationship
between the budget balance and the share of capital expenditures in total spending
observed in Table 11 and in Sturm (2001).
The level of urbanization, measured as the percentage of total population leaving
in urban areas, has a negative impact on the share of public capital spending in total
public spending. A one standard deviation increase in the level of urbanization is
associated with a 2.5 (-0.001 x 100 x 24.75) percentage points decline in the share of
capital expenditure in total public expenditure. As Sturm (2001) explains, rural areas are
likely to be more in need of public investment for the provision of infrastructure. As a
result, predominantly rural economies are associated with a bigger share of public capital
expenditure in total public expenditure.
Population growth is associated with increases in the share of public capital
expenditure in total expenditure. A rapidly increasing population puts upward pressure on
demand for health, education and public infrastructure, and thus higher capital spending
in these sectors. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the rate of population
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growth is associated with a 3.5 (0.031 x 100 x 1.12) to 4.7 (0.042 x 100 x 1.12)
percentage points increase in the share of capital expenditure in total public expenditure.
In Table 12, we present results from the log-odds (logistic) transformation
estimation of the specifications reported in Table 11 and discussed above. Results in
Table 12 are very similar to the quasi-maximum likelihood results reported in Table 11.
The signs on the coefficients match and the magnitudes of the marginal effects are
comparable. As such, for sake of brevity, we do not do a detailed discussion of these
results. The marginal effects in Table 12 are computed from equation (4.18) with y equal
to the mean share of capital expenditure in total public expenditure.
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Table 12. Log-odds transformation Estimates. The dependent variable is
Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of total Public Expenditures

Variable
Name

Coeff.

GDP Per
capita

(1)
M/effect

(2)

(3)
M/Effect

Coeff.

M/Effect

Coeff.

-0.303
-0.043
(0.024)**

-0.244
(0.032)**

-0.034

-0.230
-0.032
(0.031)**

Private
Investment

0.021
0.003
(0.003)**

0.047
(0.004)**

0.007

0.045
0.006
(0.004)**

Budget
Balance

0.029
0.004
(0.003)**

0.026
(0.005)**

0.004

0.024
0.003
(0.005)**

Rate of
Urbanization

-0.012
-0.002
(0.001)**

-0.006
(0.001)**

-0.001

-0.006
-0.001
(0.001)**

Population
Growth Rate

0.074
0.010
(0.019)**

0.171
(0.024)**

0.024

0.173
0.024
(0.024)**

Index of
Freedom

0.028
(0.014)*

-0.048
(0.023)*

-0.007

Rule of law
Index

0.004

-0.067
-0.009
(0.023)**

Index of
Corruption
N

1816

956

956

Standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes significance at 99 percent; ** denotes significance at
95 percent; * denotes significance at 90 percent.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we explored the impact of quality of governance on economic
growth using a panel data set from a sample of 100 countries for the period 1971-200045.
We employed a dynamic panel data estimator to deal with some of the common problems
associated with economic growth studies, namely persistence and endogeneity. Using
various indicators of governance from the Freedom House and the Political Risk Group,
we found the quality of governance to have a positive and statistically significant impact
on the growth rate in real per capital GDP.
Further, we investigated a potential transmission mechanism for the growth
effects of governance through the composition of public expenditures. This part of the
analysis presents two empirical issues. The first one is the fact that the dependent
variables are expenditure shares, and therefore fractional variables. As discussed in
Chapter IV, this makes linear models inappropriate. The second issue is the likelihood of
cross equation correlation in the error processes. To deal with these problems, the
dissertation uses a seemingly unrelated regressions model to estimate the impact of
governance on the functional composition of public expenditures. We also attempted to
deal with the empirical issues that result from the fractional nature of the dependent
variables by using the log-odds transformation as well as quasi-maximum likelihood
methods.
45

The sample size is smaller in some regressions.
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We find that a higher quality of governance is associated with higher spending on
education and health, and low spending on defense, everything else constant. As noted
earlier in the dissertation, this is consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis in the sense
that rent-seeking decision-makers will choose to allocate public resources in sectors that
maximize their private rents at the expense of the common good. However, the extent of
rent-extraction will depend on the incentive structures within which decisions are made.
We argue that social sectors (such as education and health) provide less opportunity for
rent extraction due to the relatively transparent nature of most activities in these sectors.
Defense spending, on the other hand, is less open to public scrutiny and thus provides
better opportunities to extract rents. With better monitoring systems and a democratic
environment, we should expect decision-makers to put relatively more emphasis on social
welfare rather than rents as the wellbeing of society in general determines the odds of
maintaining power. This explains why better governance is associated with more
spending on sectors with a direct impact on social welfare (education and health) and less
spending on defense.
In regard to the composition of expenditures by economic characteristics of the
expenditure (capital versus recurrent), we estimated the impact of governance on the
share of capital expenditure using quasi-maximum likelihood methods and the log-odds
transformation approach. The results of this empirical investigation suggest that high
quality governance is associated with a smaller share of capital expenditures in total
spending. This finding is also in agreement with the rent-seeking hypothesis. Public
capital investment usually involves huge and complex projects that are often difficult for
the public or media to monitor. For this reason, poor governance provides more
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incentives for decision-makers to spend relatively more on public investment. This also
rhymes with the finding of the World Bank public expenditure reviews that report
spending imbalances in developing countries in favor of capital expenditures.
These findings could have implications to the appropriate design of reforms,
especially in developing countries. If governance affects the composition of government
expenditures, then reforms to streamline budgetary processes or systems in developing
countries to ensure transparency and “optimal” allocation of public resources should,
perhaps, begin with reforms in the rules (or the incentive structure) that govern the
decision-making process. How governments allocate public resources has a significant
impact on both current and future growth rates, poverty levels, and overall social welfare
of their citizens. For example, less spending on education affects the future quality of
human capital, and thus economic growth.
In addition to the empirical analysis, the dissertation develops a simple model
based on Devaranjan, et al. (1996) that incorporates the quality of governance and the
composition of public expenditures in a simple growth model. Theoretically, we find that
the total impact of the quality of governance is ambiguous, but potentially depends on, at
least in part, the composition of public expenditures.
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APPENDIX A
THEORETICAL APPENDIX

The problem of the individual is to maximize utility:
∞

− ρt

U = ∫ u (c ) e

dt ; where u’ >0, and u’’ <0

(1a)

0

Subject to:
•

k = (1 − τ ) y − c

(2a)

Where, k is private capital person, and c is consumption per person.
Output per person, y is given by:
y = Vf (k , g 1, g 2) = Vk α g1β g 2γ

(3a)

α , β , γ ≥ 0 ; α + β + γ = 1 ; and following Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005), we
define V = Aψ as a product of the level of technology, A , and a measure of quality of
institutions or governance, ψ .
Let’s assume that the government runs a balanced budget. That is:

τy = g1 + g 2 = g

(4a)

Where g1 and g 2 are two types of government expenditure (per person), g is total
government expenditure per person, and τ is the tax rate.
If φ is the proportion of g spent on g1, then:
g1 = φg; and g2 = (1-φ)g

(5a)

Substituting equations 3a, 4a, and 5a into 2a, yields the following equation.
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•

k = (1 − τ )Vk α (ϕg ) β ((1 − ϕ ) g ) γ − c

(6a)

Once again, the objective of an individual consumer is to maximize (1a) subject to (6a).
We set-up the Hamiltonian function as follows:
H = u (c)e − ρt + v{(1 − τ )Vk α (ϕg ) β ((1 − ϕ ) g ) γ − c

(7a)

dH
= u ' ( c ) e − ρt − v = 0
dc

(8a)
•

We now differentiate H with respect to k and set the result equal to v :
•
dH
= v(1 − τ )Vαk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ ) = − v
dk

(9a)

Now we differentiate (8a) with respect to time, t.
•

•

→ u '(c)e − ρt − ρe − ρt u ' (c) = v

(10a)

Substitute (10a) into (9a):
•

e − ρ t [ u '( c ) − ρ u ' ( c )] = − v (1 − τ )V α k ( α − 1 ) ϕ

β

(1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β + γ )

(11a)

From equation (8a), substitute for v in (11a);
•

→ e − ρt [u '(c) − ρu ' (c)] = u ' (c)e − ρt B

(12a)

Where B = (1 − τ )Vαk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ )
From (12a),
•

[u '(c) − ρu ' (c)] = u ' (c) B
•

u '(c)
=ρ−B
→
u ' (c )
Let u (c) =

c 1−σ − 1
1−σ

(13a)

(14a)
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→ u' = c −σ ; and u ' ' = −σ * c −σ −1

•

Now, u '(c) =

•
du ' dc
*
= u' ' c
dc dt

(15a)

(16a)

Substituting (15a) and (16a) into (13a) yields:
•

•

− σ * c −σ −1 c − σ * c
=
=ρ−B
c
c −σ
•

c B−ρ
→ =
σ
c

(17a)

Recall that B = (1 − τ )Vαk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ )
•

c (1 − τ )Vαk (α −1)ϕ β (1 − ϕ ) γ g ( β +γ ) − ρ
→ Let µ = =
σ
c

Equation (18a) represents the rate of growth in consumption.

(18a)
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APPENDIX B
THE DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATORS46

We begin with a simple autoregressive model:
y it = αy i ,t −1 + u it ; i = 1,..., N ; t = 1,..., T

(1b)

And u it = ci + vit
We first difference (1a) to eliminate the individual effects, and obtain:
y it − y i ,t −1 = α ( y i ,t −1 − y i ,t −2 ) + (vit − vi ,t −1 )

(2b)

Since we have ( yi ,t −1 − yi ,t − 2 ) on the right-hand side, the fist period we observe is t = 3 .
That is:
y i 3 − y i 2 = α ( y i 2 − y i1 ) + (vi 3 − vi 2 ) .
For this first observable period, y i1 is a valid instrument for ( yi 2 − yi1 ) because it’s
highly correlated to ( yi 2 − yi1 ) but uncorrelated to (vi 3 − vi 2 ) . For the second observable
period, t = 4, both y i1 and y i 2 are valid instruments for ( y i 3 − y i 2 ) since they are both
uncorrelated with (vi 4 − vi 3 ) . Successive periods through period t = T yield a set of
instruments given by ( y i1 , y i 2 ,... y i ,T − 2 ) .
If the matrix of instruments, Z = ( Z 1' , Z 2' ,..., Z N' ) then we can define:
0
⎡( y i1 )
⎤
⎢
⎥
( y i1 , y i 2 )
⎢
⎥
Zi =
⎢
⎥
..
⎢
⎥
( y i1 ,..., y i ,T −2 ⎦
⎣ 0
46

This section of the Appendix is heavily based on Baltagi (1995) and Behr (2003).
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The moment conditions implied by this instrumental procedure are therefore given by:
E ( Z i' ∆vi ) = 0

(3b)

Where ∆vi' = (vi 3 − vi 2 ,..., viT − vi ,T −1 )
The error term in (2a) is a differenced, which implies that E (∆vi ∆vi' ) = σ v2 ( I N ⊗ H ) 47,
where,
⎡ 2 −1 0
⎢− 1 2 − 1
⎢
⎢ .
.
.
H =⎢
.
.
⎢ .
⎢0 0 0
⎢
⎣⎢ 0 0 0

.. .
0⎤
.. .
0 ⎥⎥
.. .
. ⎥
⎥ is (T − 2) × (T − 2) .
.. .
. ⎥
.. 2 − 1⎥
⎥
.. − 1 2 ⎦⎥

The one-step estimator minimizes
'

i= N
i=N
⎛
⎞
⎛
⎞
J N = ⎜ N −1 ∑ Z i' ∆vi ⎟ W N ⎜ N −1 ∑ Z i' ∆vi ⎟
i =1
i =1
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠

(4b)

W N = W N 1 = [ N −1 ∑i Z i′HZ i ] −1

(5b)

^

α = [(∆y −1 ) ' Z ( Z ' ( I N ⊗ H ) Z ) −1 Z ' (∆y −1 )]−1 × [(∆y −1 ) ' Z ( Z ' ( I N ⊗ H ) Z ) −1 Z ' (∆y )]

(6b)

The Arellano and Bond (1991) optimal Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)
estimator of α is based on the moment restrictions in equation (3a). It’s operationalized
by replacing ∆v by residuals ( ∆v̂ ) obtained from the preliminary step. This results in the
Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM estimator given by the following.

αˆ 2 = [(∆y −1 )′ZW −1 Z ′(∆y −1 )]−1 [(∆y −1 )′ZW −1 Z ′(∆y )]

47

See Baltagi (1995), Pages 125-132

(7b)
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N

Where W = ∑ Z i' (∆vˆi )(∆vˆi ) ' Z i and ∆vˆi = ∆y i − αˆ∆y i , −1 , where α̂ is the one-step GMM
i =1

estimate of α .
The consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of α̂ 2 is given by the first term on the
right-hand side of (6a). That is,
a var(αˆ 2 ) = [(∆y −1 ) ' ZW −1 Z ' (∆y −1 )]−1

(8b)

Introducing additional explanatory (exogenous or predetermined) variables changes the
matrix of instruments, Z48.
For T = 4 , when x is strictly exogenous,
⎡ y , x ,..., xi 4
Z i = ⎢ i1 i1
0
⎣

⎤
y i1 , y i 2 , xi1 ,..., xi 4 ⎥⎦
0

When x is predetermined,
⎡y , x , x
Z i = ⎢ i1 i1 i 2
0
⎣

⎤
y i1 , y i 2 , xi1 , xi 2 , xi 3 ⎥⎦
0

And when x is endogenous,
⎡y , x
Z i = ⎢ i1 i1
⎣ 0

⎤
y i1 , y i 2 , xi1 , xi 2 ⎥⎦
0

However, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is inefficient in the presence of weak
instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest an estimator that is a combination of
moment conditions for differences and levels. The estimator is referred to as the GMM
System Estimator.

48

See Behr (2003) for details on this.
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If X contains endogenous variables such that:
E ( xit vis ) ≠ 0 for i = 1,..., N and s ≤ t , then:

Z iD

0
0
⎤
⎡[ y i1 , xi′1 ]
⎥
⎢ 0
[ y i1 , y i 2, xi′1 , xi′2 ] …
0
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
0
0
0
=
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢ 0
′
′
0
0
[
y
,
y
,...,
y
,
x
,
x
,...,
x
]
i1
i2
i ,T − 2
i1
i2
i ,T −1 ⎦
⎣

0
…
0
⎤
⎡[∆y i 2 , ∆xi′2 ]
⎥
⎢
0
[∆y i 2 , ∆y i 3 ∆xi′2 , ∆xi′3 ] …
0
⎥
⎢
⎥
0
0
0
Z iL = ⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎢
0
0
[∆y i 2 ,..., ∆y i ,T − 2 , ∆xi′2 ,..., ∆xi′,T −1 ]⎥⎦
⎣

⎡Z D
Zi = ⎢ i
⎣ 0

0 ⎤
⎥
Z iL ⎦

The Blundell and Bond (1998) first step Estimator uses the covariance matrix given by:
N

V = Z ′AZ = ∑ Z i′ AT Z i

(9b)

i =1

⎡H D
A = ( I N ⊗ G D ,L ) Where G D , L = ⎢ i
⎣ 0

H iD

⎡1
⎢0
= H as given above and H iL = ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣0

0 ⎤
⎥ and
H iL ⎦

0
1
0

… 0⎤
0⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
0 1⎦
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The Two-step GMM estimator uses the residuals of the first step estimation to estimate
the covariance matrix Vˆ .
The resulting two-step estimator is given by:

δˆSYM = ( XZVˆ −1 Z ′X ) −1 X ′ZVˆ −1 Z ′y

(10b)

Where X is a matrix of explanatory variables (including lagged values of the dependent
variable) for both the first differenced and the levels equations.
Identification Tests49
Second-order Serial Correlation

Let y = Xδ + v the first-difference equation. The vector of residuals is given by;
vˆ = y − Xδˆ = v − X (δˆ − δ ) , where δˆ is an estimator in (10b), with an appropriate Z
and Vˆ −1 .
The consistency of the GMM estimators is based on the assumption that
E (vit vi ,t − 2 ) = 0 . Again, v is a vector of first-differenced errors.
The test statistic for the second-order serial correlation, based on residuals from the firstdifference equation, is given by:

m=

vˆ −' 2 vˆ* ~
a N (0,1) under the null of E (vit vi ,t − 2 ) = 0 and
1
2
vˆ

vˆ = ∑i =1 vi' ,( −2 ) vˆi* vi'* vˆi ( −2) − 2vˆ −' 2 X * ( X ' ZW N 2 Z ' X ) −1 X ' ZW N 2 (∑i =1 Z i' vˆi vˆi'* vˆi ( −2)
N

+ vˆ −' 2 X * a vâr(δˆ ) X *' vˆ− 2

49

These tests are drawn directly from Arellano and Bond (1991).

N
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An asterisk denotes variables that have been trimmed to match the second lag of the
first-difference error term.

The Sargan/Hansen Test of Over-identifying Restrictions

The null hypothesis for this test is that instruments are valid in that they are not correlated
with the errors in the first-differenced equation. The test statistic is given by the value of
the objective function in (4b), evaluated at the optimal second-step GMM estimates
obtained from (10b).
Therefore,
'

⎛1 N
⎞
⎛1 N
⎞
S = N ⎜ ∑ Z i' vˆi 2 ⎟ W N 2 ⎜ ∑ Z i' vˆi 2 ⎟ ~ χ q2 , with q equal to the total number of
⎝ N i =1
⎠
⎝ N i =1
⎠
instruments minus the number of parameters in the model.
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APPENDIX C
THE SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS (SUR) MODEL

Model Set Up

Suppose the jth of the M equations is given by the following.
y j = x j β j + u j for j = 1,..., M ; y j is T × 1 ; x j is T × k ; and u j is k × 1 . The entire set of
equations can be represented by:
Y = Xβ + U
Or
⎡ x1
⎡ y1 ⎤ ⎢
⎢ . ⎥ ⎢0
⎢ ⎥ ⎢.
⎢ . ⎥=⎢
⎢ ⎥ ⎢.
⎢ . ⎥ ⎢.
⎢⎣ y M ⎥⎦ ⎢
⎣⎢ 0

(1c)

0

. . .

x2

. . .

.

. . .

.

. . .

.

. . .

0

. . .

0 ⎤
⎡β ⎤ ⎡u ⎤
0 ⎥⎥ ⎢ 1 ⎥ ⎢ 1 ⎥
.
.
. ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎥*⎢ . ⎥ + ⎢ . ⎥
. ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
.
.
. ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎥ ⎢ β M ⎥ ⎢u M ⎥
x M ⎦⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦

The variance-covariance matrix of the errors is given by:
⎡ Eu1u1′
⎢ .
⎢
Ω=⎢ .
⎢
⎢ .
⎢⎣ Eu M u1′

. . .
.
.
.
. . .

Eu1u ′M ⎤
. ⎥⎥
. ⎥
⎥
. ⎥
Eu M u ′M ⎥⎦

(2c)

Each diagonal element of the matrix in (2c) is a T × T variance-covariance matrix of
residuals for each equation. The off-diagonal elements are also T × T block matrices of
covariance between errors of pairs of equations.
The efficient estimator of β in equation (1c) is given by:
βˆ = ( X ′Ω −1 X ) −1 X ′Ω −1Y
SUR

(3c)
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APPENDIX D
THE LOG-ODDS TRANSFORMATION

With 0 < y < 1 , it is reasonable that a logistic model fits the data. That is,
y=

1
1 + e − Xβ

(1d)

→ (1 + e − xβ ) y = 1
→ e − Xβ =

1
1− y
−1 =
y
y

→ e Xβ =

y
1− y

⎛ y ⎞
⎟⎟ = Xβ
→ log⎜⎜
⎝1− y ⎠

(2d)

Interpretation of coefficient Estimates from equation (2d)

Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1990), we solve for change in y due to a given change
in X i.e. ∆y ∆x .
⎛ y ⎞
⎟⎟ = β̂ ∆x
∆ log⎜⎜
⎝1− y ⎠

⎛ y ⎞
⎟
∆ ⎜⎜
⎛ y ⎞
1 − y ⎟⎠
⎝
⎟⎟ ≈
= βˆ∆x
∆ log ⎜⎜
⎛
⎞
y
y
1
−
⎝
⎠
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
y
1
−
⎝
⎠

=

∆y (1 − y ) − y∆(1 − y ) (1 − y )
×
= β̂∆x
y
(1 − y ) 2

=

∆y − y∆y + y∆y 1
× = β̂ ∆x
y
(1 − y )
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=

→

∆y
= β̂ ∆x
y (1 − y )
∆y ˆ
= β [ y (1 − y )]
∆x

(3d)
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APPENDIX E
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Table E1. Data Sources
Variable

Variable Description

Primary Data
Source

Political Rights

A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that
indicates the degree of political rights in
regard to existence of free and fair elections,
competitive parties or other political
groupings, an opposition that plays a
significant role in political decision-making,
and the rights of minority groups to selfgovernment. A rating of 1 indicates highest
level of political rights (closest to the ideals)
suggested in the survey

Freedom in the World
2003; Freedom House

Civil Liberties

A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that
indicates the degree of civil liberties in regard
to aspects such as the degree of freedom of
expression, assembly, association, education,
religion, and an equitable system of rule of
law. A rating of 1 indicates the highest level
of civil liberties.

Freedom in the World
2003; Freedom House

Freedom

A simple average of the index of political
rights and the index of civil liberties

Computed by the
author

Rule of Law

An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures
perceptions of crime, the effectiveness,
independence, and impartiality of the
judiciary. In general, it measures the extent to
which economic agents respects the rules that
govern their interactions. The higher the
score, the better the performance of the
respective country.

Waseem Mina, 2002
(Data originally
obtained from the
academic version of
the International
Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) published by
the Political Risk
Group (PRS))

A) Measures of
Governance
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Waseem Mina, 2002
(Data originally
obtained from the
academic version of
the International
Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) published by
the Political Risk
Group (PRS))
Waseem Mina, 2002
(Data originally
obtained from the
academic version of
the International
Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) published by
the Political Risk
Group (PRS))

Corruption

An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures
perceptions of corruption. Corruption in this
context is defined as the exercise of public
power for private gain. A higher score
indicates lower expectations of corruption.

Bureaucratic Quality

An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures
bureaucratic delays and the general
effectiveness of the government bureaucracy.
A higher score indicates a more effective
bureaucracy.

Risk of Repudiation

An index on a scale of 0 to 10 that measures
the risk that government will renege on their
contracts by modifying the terms due to
budget cuts resulting from revenue drops or
any political reasons.

Waseem Mina, 2002
(Data originally
obtained from the
academic version of
the International
Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) published by
the Political Risk
Group (PRS))

Risk of Expropriation

This is an index on a scale of 0 to 10 that
measures the risk of expropriation of private
property by government through confiscation
or nationalization.

Waseem Mina, 2002
(Data originally
obtained from the
academic version of
the International
Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) published by
the Political Risk
Group (PRS))
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B) Public Expenditures
IMF's Government
Finance Statistics
(GFS), January 2004
CD-ROM, and the
World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM
IMF's Government
Finance Statistics
(GFS), January 2004
CD-ROM

Capital Expenditures

Capital expenditure is spending to acquire
fixed capital assets, land, intangible assets,
government stocks, and nonmilitary, nonfinancial assets. This variable is measured as
a percentage of total expenditures.

Health Expenditures

Public health expenditure consists of
recurrent and capital spending from
government (central and local) budgets,
external borrowings and grants (including
donations from international agencies and
nongovernmental organizations), and social
(or compulsory) health insurance funds.

Education Expenditures

Public expenditure on education consists of
public spending on public education plus
subsidies to private education at the primary,
secondary, and tertiary levels.

IMF's Government
Finance Statistics
(GFS), January 2004
CD-ROM.

Defense Expenditures

Includes all current and capital expenditures
on the armed forces, including peacekeeping
forces; defense ministries and other
government agencies engaged in defense
projects; paramilitary forces, if these are
judged to be trained and equipped for
military operations; and military space
activities.

IMF's Government
Finance Statistics
(GFS), January 2004
CD-ROM
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C) Other economic and
Demographic Variables
GDP per Capita

GDP per capita is gross domestic product
divided by midyear population. GDP is the
sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in
the value of the products. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation
of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources. Data are in
constant U.S. dollars

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

GDP per capita growth
rate

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per
capita based on constant local currency

Investment

Includes land improvements (fences, ditches,
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and
equipment purchases; and the construction of
roads, railways, and the like, including
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential
dwellings, and commercial and industrial
buildings.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM
World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Export growth

Annual growth rate of exports of goods and
services based on constant local currency.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Government Consumption

General government final consumption
expenditure includes all government current
expenditures for purchases of goods and
services (including compensation of
employees)

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Schooling

A measure of education attainment in terms
of the average years of schooling for the total
population over the age of 15 years

Barro, J. Robert and
Jong-Wha Lee, 2000

Budget Balance

Overall budget balance is current and capital
revenue and official grants received, less total
expenditure and lending minus repayments.
Data are shown for central government only.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM
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Urbanization

The share of the total population living in
areas defined as urban in each country.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Population under 15 years
of age

The percentage of the total population that is
in the age group 0 to 14 years.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Population between 15
and 65 years of age

Percentage of the total population that is in
the age group 15 to 64 years.

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Population over 65 years
of age

Percentage of the total population that is 65
years or older.

Population Growth Rate

Annual population growth rate

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM
World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM

Population Density

Population density is midyear population
divided by land area in square kilometers

World banks' World
Development
Indicators - 2003 CDROM
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Table E2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Growth Equations
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Per Capital GDP Growth
Initial GDP Per Capita (10,000s)
Government Consumption
Private Investment
Growth in Exports
Years of Schooling
Political freedom Index
Rule of Law Index
Corruption Index
Quality of bureaucracy
Risk of contract repudiation
Risk of Property expropriation

540
540
540
540
540
540
540
341
341
341
341
341

1.58
0.65
15.49
22.35
5.91
5.40
3.48
3.56
3.46
3.44
6.85
7.47

3.03
0.94
5.86
6.86
7.41
2.80
1.92
1.63
1.48
1.62
2.18
2.20

-10.22
0.01
3.92
5.53
-28.39
0.26
1
0.56
0
0.63
2.22
1.63

11.98
4.50
37.98
60.14
69.81
12.05
7
6
6
6
10
10
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Table E3. Correlation Matrix – Growth and Indicators of Governance

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(1)
1
0.15
-0.02
0.47
0.49
0.28
-0.24
0.30
0.23
0.27
0.41
0.40

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1
0.44
0.07
-0.02
0.76
-0.67
0.75
0.74
0.80
0.68
0.57

1
0.10
-0.16
0.37
-0.34
0.38
0.52
0.45
0.32
0.26

1
0.26
0.21
-0.10
0.18
0.13
0.15
0.24
0.21

1
0.07
-0.05
0.09
0.05
0.08
0.12
0.15

1
-0.70
0.69
0.67
0.71
0.73
0.63

1
-0.64
-0.63
-0.64
-0.62
-0.57

Per capita GDP growth
Initial GDP per capita
Government Consumption
Private Investment
Export growth
Average years of schooling
Index of Political Freedom
Rule of Law index
Index of corruption

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11) (12)

1
0.80
1
0.82 0.84
0.81 0.69
0.81 0.65

1
0.77
0.70

1
0.91

(10) Quality of bureaucracy
(11) Risk of repudiating contracts
(12) Risk of expropriating private property.

1
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Table E4. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Expenditure Composition Models
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Health Expend. Share
Education Expend. Share
Defense Expend. Share
Per Capita GDP (10000s)
Budget Balance
Urban
Pop. Under 14 (%)
Pop between15 & 64 (%)
Pop 65yrs + (%)
Pop growth Rate
Pop density
Political freedom Index
Capital Expend. Share
Rule of law Index
Corruption Index

1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1402
1356
742
742

0.07
0.12
0.10
0.93
-3.26
59.58
32.02
60.38
7.52
1.57
231.71
3.01
0.17
4.04
3.90

0.05
0.06
0.08
1.02
5.79
24.75
9.65
5.88
4.57
1.12
700.29
1.86
0.12
1.62
1.48

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
-35.56
2.86
15.70
47.03
1.19
-1.92
1.72
1
0.01
0
0

0.33
0.30
0.56
4.68
58.71
100.00
49.17
73.76
17.90
6.83
6586.89
7
0.62
6
6
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Table E5. Hausman Tests for Endogeneity
Variable

Test Statistic

D.F

Investment

26.83

13

22.362

reject H0

School

16.61

13

22.362

Fail to reject H0

Export growth

222.19

13

22.362

reject H0

Government
consumption

10.69

13

22.362

Fail to reject H0

Freedom

12.14

13

22.362

Fail to reject H0

χ2 (α = 0.05)

Decision

H0: there is no systematic difference in the coefficients.
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